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Abstract
We show that in a class of I–agent mechanism design problems with evidence, com-
mitment is unnecessary, randomization has no value, and robust incentive compatibility
has no cost. In particular, for each agent i, we construct a simple disclosure game be-
tween the principal and agent i where the equilibrium strategies of the agents in these
disclosure games give their equilibrium strategies in the game corresponding to the mech-
anism but where the principal is not committed to his response. In this equilibrium, the
principal obtains the same payoff as in the optimal mechanism with commitment. As an
application, we show that certain costly verification models can be characterized using
equilibrium analysis of an associated model of evidence.
1 Introduction
We show that in a class of I–agent mechanism design problems with evidence, random-
ization has no value for the principal and robust incentive compatibility — a form of
incentive compatibility analogous to but stronger than ex post incentive compatibility
and dominant strategy incentive compatibility — has no cost. Also, commitment is un-
necessary in the sense that there is an equilibrium of the game when the principal is not
committed to the mechanism with the same outcome as in the optimal mechanism with
commitment. This equilibrium can be derived from a collection of I auxiliary games,
where the ith game is a simple disclosure game between agent i and the principal. As
an application, we show that certain mechanism design problems with costly verification
can be solved via an associated evidence model.1
To understand these results, consider the following example, the simple allocation
problem. The principal has one unit of an indivisible good which he can allocate to
one of I agents. Each agent i has private information in the form of her type ti which
determines vi(ti), the value to the principal of allocating the good to agent i. Each agent
prefers getting the good to not getting it, regardless of her type. Types are independent
across agents and monetary transfers are not possible. Each agent may have evidence
which proves some facts about her type. For example, the principal may be a dean with
one job slot to allocate to a department in the College. Each department wants the
slot and has private information about the person the department would likely hire with
the slot, information that is relevant to the value to the dean of assigning the slot to
the department. Alternatively, the principal may be a state government which needs to
choose a city in which to locate a public hospital. The state wants to place the hospital
where it will be most efficiently utilized, but each city wants the hospital and has private
information on local needs.
In a mechanism design formulation, the principal commits to how he will allocate
the good as a function of cheap talk reports and evidence presentation by the agents.
A version of the Revelation Principle implies we can restrict attention to mechanisms
where each agent reports her type truthfully and, in a sense to be defined later, presents
all her evidence.
Alternatively, we could consider a game in which agents send evidence to the principal
without any commitment by the principal, which we call the game without commitment.
In this game, the principal forms beliefs about the types of the agents and allocates the
good optimally given these beliefs. That is, the principal responds to the evidence and
claims presented by forming a belief about vi(ti) for each agent i and allocates the good
1In a model with costly verification, the agents do not have evidence to present but the principal can
learn the true type of an agent at a cost.
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to that agent for whom his expectation of vi(ti) is largest. Since all agents want the good,
in an equilibrium of this game, each agent i tries to persuade the principal that vi(ti) is
large.
This last observation implies that we could find certain equilibria of the game without
commitment by means of what we call auxiliary games. For each agent i, consider the
two–player game between i and the principal where type ti has available the same cheap–
talk messages and evidence she has in the game without commitment. The principal
chooses an action x ∈ R. The principal’s payoff is −(vi(ti)− x)2 and the agent’s payoff
is x. In other words, x is the principal’s “estimate” of vi(ti) and the agent’s utility is
increasing in the principal’s estimate. Intuitively, the auxiliary game identifies the best
strategy for agent i to use to try to convince the principal that vi(ti) is large, just as
she wants to do in the game without commitment. For each agent i, find an equilibrium
of the auxiliary game for i. Then we can find an equilibrium for the game without
commitment by having each agent play her strategy from the auxiliary game with the
principal choosing a best response to the information this reveals to him. This equilibrium
will be robust in the sense that no agent’s beliefs about other agents plays any role in
the equilibrium. We will show that the outcome in the best equilibrium so constructed
is the same as the outcome in the optimal mechanism.2 This implies that the optimal
mechanism is robust in a similar sense. Consequently, many other games generate the
same results — for example, if agents speak sequentially observing previous speakers,
each will still wish to persuade the principal that her vi is large and so her equilibrium
strategy will not change.
One way to understand why the equilibrium has the same outcome as the optimal
mechanism is to ask how the principal might use commitment to improve on the equilib-
rium. Conditional on any type of agent i whose type is perfectly revealed to the principal
in equilibrium, it is clear that the principal cannot improve his payoff in a mechanism
since he optimizes in equilibrium given exact knowledge of the type.
So consider a set of types of agent i that pool in equilibrium. Since they pool, the
principal treats these types as if the value of giving the good to them were the average
of vi(ti) across the pool. Given a type in this pool whose value is above the average, the
principal would like to be able to separate this type from the pool and give her the good
more often. This type would also like this response, so if she did not separate in the
equilibrium, it must be because she does not have evidence that would enable her to do
so. This lack of evidence also makes it impossible for the principal to separate her in an
incentive compatible manner in a mechanism, so, again, the principal cannot improve.
Finally, consider a type in the pool whose value is below the average. The principal
2There could be several equilibria in the auxiliary game for agent i, in which case this construction
gives multiple equilibria for the game without commitment.
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would like to separate this type from the pool to give her the good less often. It’s possible
that this type has evidence that would separate her from the pool but that she withholds
this evidence in equilibrium to avoid revealing her low value. In a mechanism, the
principal can promise to reward the agent for this revelation and so can use commitment
to induce her to separate from the pool. However, he doesn’t want to: rewarding this
type means giving her the good more often, but he wants the information so that he can
give it to her less often. Hence, again, the principal cannot use commitment to improve
the outcome.
Our results apply to a broader class of allocation problems. For example, consider
our example of a dean, but suppose the dean has several job slots to allocate where each
department can have at most one and there are fewer slots than departments. A related
problem is the allocation of a budget across divisions by the head of a firm. Suppose
the organization has a fixed amount of money to allocate and that the value produced
by a division is a function of its budget and its privately known productivity. Here each
division wants to persuade top management that its productivity is high. Alternatively,
consider a task allocation problem where the principal is a manager who must choose
an employee to carry out a particular job. Suppose none of the employees wants to do
the task and each has private information about how well she would do it. Here each
employee wishes to convince the manager that her productivity is low.
A more complex example is a task that some employees would and some would not
want to do, where both the employee’s ability and desire to do the job are private
information. In this case, certain types of employees wish to persuade the manager that
they would perform poorly, while others have the opposite incentive and these incentives
could be correlated with the value to the manager of assigning them the task. Our results
cover this case as well.
A different class of examples is public goods problems. The principal chooses whether
or not to provide a public good. If the principal provides the good, the cost is evenly
divided among the agents. Each agent has a type which determines her willingness to pay
for the good. If the willingness to pay exceeds her share of the cost, she wants the good
to be provided and otherwise prefers that it not be provided. Types are independent
across agents and monetary transfers other than the cost sharing are not possible. Each
agent may have evidence which enables her to prove some facts about the value of the
public good to her. For example, the principal may be a government agency deciding
whether or not to build a hospital in a particular city and the agents may be residents
of that city who will be taxed to pay for the hospital if it is built. Then an agent might
show documentation of a health condition or past emergency room visits to prove to the
principal that she has a high value for a nearby hospital. The principal maximizes a
weighted sum of the agents’ utilities, possibly including a benefit or cost of his own for
providing the public good. Here some types wish to persuade the principal that they
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highly value the public good, while others wish to persuade him of the opposite.
The conclusion that the principal does not require commitment is important for sev-
eral reasons. First, it is not always obvious whether commitment is an appropriate
assumption for a given setting. Our result says that we obtain the same outcome ei-
ther way. Second, in some settings, whether the principal is committed is endogenous.
In the settings we consider, we predict that the principal would not invest to achieve
commitment power.
Another useful implication of our results is that we can compute optimal mechanisms
by considering equilibria of the game without commitment. In particular, as discussed
above, we can characterize the relevant equilibrium by means of a collection of I auxiliary
games, one for each agent, where the game for agent i is a simple disclosure game between
agent i and the principal. The auxiliary game does not depend on the principal’s prefer-
ences in the original mechanism design problem or the structure of the set of allocations.
In some cases, the use of auxiliary games makes determining the optimal mechanism
straightforward. In particular, if each auxiliary game either has a unique equilibrium or
a unique “most informative” equilibrium, we can use these equilibria to directly compute
the information the principal uses in the optimal mechanism. Given this information, it
is straightforward to compute the outcome under the optimal mechanism.
To illustrate, we consider optimal mechanisms with the evidence technology proposed
by Dye (1985). In Dye’s model, each agent has some probability of having evidence that
would enable her to exactly prove her type and otherwise has no evidence. When we
apply this approach to the simple allocation problem or to the public good problem,
we find optimal mechanisms reminiscient of optimal mechanisms in a different context,
namely, under costly verification. We discuss this connection to Ben-Porath, Dekel,
and Lipman (2014) (henceforth BDL) and to Erlanson and Kleiner (2017) in Section 3.2
where we show that a class of costly verification models can be solved using our results for
evidence models. This connection does not imply that all of our results for mechanisms
with evidence carry over to costly verification models, only that optimal mechanisms for
costly verification can be computed via Dye–evidence models.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal model. In Section 2.5,
we state the main results sketched above. The proof of this theorem is sketched and the
roles of the assumptions explained in Section 4. In Section 3, we specialize to Dye (1985)
evidence and provide a characterization of optimal mechanisms in this setting. We then
use this characterization to give optimal mechanisms for a variety of more specific settings
including the simple allocation problem and the public goods problem. We also show that
under some conditions, optimal mechanisms for costly verification can be solved using
the optimal mechanisms for Dye evidence. We discuss the related literature in Section
5. Proofs not contained in the text are in the Appendix or the Online Appendix.
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2 Model and Results
The set of agents is I = {1, . . . , I} where I ≥ 1. The principal has a finite set of feasible
actions A and can randomize over these. For example, in the simple allocation problem,
we have A = I where a = i means that the good is allocated to i.3 More generally, a ∈ A
can be interpreted as an allocation of money (where money is finitely divisible) as well
as other goods, public or private. It is notationally complex but not difficult to extend
our results to the case where A is infinite. Each agent i has private information in the
form of a type ti where types are distributed independently across agents. The finite set
of types of i is denoted Ti and ρi is the (full support) prior.
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2.1 Preferences
We first state our assumptions on preferences and then explain the interpretation. Given
action a by the principal and type profile t = (t1, . . . , tI), agent i’s utility is ui(a, ti) and
the principal’s utility is v(a, t) where
ui(a, ti) =
{
ui(a), if ti ∈ T+i ;
−ui(a), if ti ∈ T−i ≡ Ti \ T+i ,
and
v(a, t) = u0(a) +
I∑
i=1
ui(a, ti)v¯i(ti) = u0(a) +
I∑
i=1
ui(a)vi(ti)
where
vi(ti) =
{
v¯i(ti), if ti ∈ T+i ;
−v¯i(ti), if ti ∈ T−i .
For brevity, let v0(t0) = 1 and write this as
∑
i ui(a)vi(ti) with the convention that the
sum runs from i = 0 to I.
The principal’s utility function has two natural interpretations. First, we can interpret
v as a social welfare function where v¯i(ti) reflects how much the principal “cares” about
agent i’s utility. Second, we can think of v¯i(ti) as measuring the extent to which the
principal’s interests are aligned with agent i’s. That is, a high value of v¯i(ti) doesn’t
mean that the principal likes agent i but that the principal likes what agent i likes.
3This formulation assumes the principal must allocate the good to some agent. Alternatively, we can
set A = {0, 1, . . . , I} where a = 0 is interpreted as the principal keeping the good. Our results hold for
either specification.
4Finiteness of Ti is primarily for tractability. As we will point out, there is one step in our proofs
which does not obviously generalize to infinite type spaces.
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We do not restrict the sign of v¯i(ti) or vi(ti). Thus the principal’s interests can be in
conflict with those of some or all agents in a way which depends on the agents’ types.
Turning to the agents, our formulation relaxes the restriction to type–independent
preferences commonly used in the literature (see Section 5 for a survey), but requires
that the type dependence takes a particularly simple form. Hence we call our assumption
on the agents’ utility functions simple type dependence. It says that all types of agent
i have the same indifference sets over A since if ui(a) = ui(a
′), then every type of i is
indifferent between a and a′. Thus the only differences between types is the direction in
which utility is increasing. Specifically, the types in T+i have utility increasing in ui(a),
while those in T−i have utility decreasing in this direction. We call the types in T
+
i the
positive types and those in T+i the negative types. While restrictive, this formulation
allows a broad range of interesting forms of type dependence.
For one thing, simple type dependence accommodates all the examples discussed in
the introduction. We illustrate with two examples. First, consider the simple allocation
problem. Let A = {1, . . . , I} where a = i means the principal allocates the good to agent
i. Since every type desires the good, assume Ti = T
+
i , so T
−
i = ∅ and let
ui(a) =
{
1, if a = i;
0, otherwise.
Let u0(a) ≡ 0. Then our assumption on v implies vi(ti) is the value to the principal of
allocating the good to agent i when his type is ti.
As another example, consider the public goods problem. Let A = {0, 1}, where 1 is
providing the good and 0 not providing it. Let the utility function for agent i be avi(ti)
and the utility function for the principal be the sum of the agent’s utilities or
∑
i avi(ti).
For simplicity, assume vi(ti) 6= 0 for every ti and every i. Then we can renormalize the
utility function for ti by dividing through by |vi(ti)|. After renormalizing, the utility
function of agent i is {
a, if vi(ti) > 0;
−a, if vi(ti) < 0.
Letting ui(a) = a and defining T
+
i = {ti ∈ Ti | vi(ti) > 0}, we obtain a case of simple
type dependence. The principal’s utility function equals
∑
i ui(a)vi(ti), as assumed.
An example not discussed in the introduction but commonly used in the literature
has ui(a) = a for every i and
v(a, t) = −
I∑
i=1
αi(a− βi(ti))2.
Here the principal wants to guess the agents’ types (βi(ti)’s) and all agents want to be
thought of as having a high βi. This does not look like the principal’s utility function we
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assumed, but we can rewrite this as
v(a, t) = −a2
∑
i
αi +
∑
i
a2βi(ti)−
∑
i
αi(βi(ti))
2.
The last term is not relevant to the principal’s choice of mechanism, so we can renormalize
by dropping it. Letting u0(a) = −a2
∑
i αi and vi(ti) = 2βi(ti) yields our model.
As noted above, a special case of simple type dependence is type–independent prefer-
ences, the case studied in much of the literature including all previous work on commit-
ment in mechanisms with evidence. Simple type dependence also holds trivially when
the agent has only two type–independent indifference curves over A. For example, if the
principal has only two actions, as in Glazer–Rubinstein (2004, 2006), then, there can
only be two indifference curves (at most). Similarly, consider a type–dependent version
of the simple allocation problem where each agent cares only about whether she receives
the good or not, but some types prefer to get the good and others prefer not to.5 Here
the principal has as many actions as there are agents, but each agent has only two indif-
ference curves over A. Again, there are only two (nontrivial) preferences over ∆(A), so
simple type dependence is without loss of generality.
2.2 Evidence
Each agent may have evidence which would prove some claims about herself. Formally,
for every i, there is a function Ei : Ti → 22Ti . In other words, Ei(ti) is a collection
of subsets of Ti, interpreted as the set of events that ti can prove. The idea is that if
ei ∈ Ei(ti), then type ti has some set of documents or other tangible evidence which she
can present to the principal which demonstrates conclusively that her type is in the set
ei ⊂ Ti. For example, if agent i presents a house deed with her name on it, she proves
that she is one of the types who owns a house. We require the following properties.
First, proof is true. Formally, ei ∈ Ei(ti) implies ti ∈ ei. Second, proof is consistent in
the sense that si ∈ ei ∈ E(ti) implies ei ∈ Ei(si). In other words, if there is a piece of
evidence that some type can present which does not rule out si, then it must be true
that si could present that evidence. Otherwise, the evidence does rule out si. In short,
for any ei ∈ ∪si∈TiEi(si), we have ti ∈ ei if and only if ei ∈ Ei(ti).
We also assume normality (Bull and Watson (2007), Lipman and Seppi (1995)).
This convenient simplication, used in much of the literature, says that ti can prove an
event which summarizes all the evidence she has. Intuitively, there are no time or other
restrictions on the evidence an agent can present, so she can present everything she has.
5This formulation is natural if the “good” is a task assignment as discussed in the introduction.
7
Formally, for every ti, we have ⋂
ei∈Ei(ti)
ei ∈ Ei(ti).
That is, if ti can prove that her type is in ei, e
′
i, etc., then she can prove that her type
is in all of these sets and hence in their intersection. More precisely, this intersection is
itself an event that ti can prove. Henceforth, we denote this maximally informative event
by
Mi(ti) =
⋂
ei∈Ei(ti)
ei
and sometimes refer to ti presenting Mi(ti) as presenting maximal evidence.
As usual, we assume that all of an agent’s private information is summarized by
her type. Thus it is common knowledge what evidence each agent has as a function
of her type. On the other hand, our robustness result implies that no agent needs to
know anything about other agents — in particular, no agent needs to understand what
evidence others might have.
2.3 Mechanisms
Given our assumptions, it is without loss of generality to focus on mechanisms where the
agents simultaneously make cheap talk reports of types and present evidence and where
each agent truthfully reveals her type and presents maximal evidence. This version of
the Revelation Principle has been shown by, among others, Bull and Watson (2007) and
Deneckere and Severinov (2008). As in the usual model, we might not need agents to
reveal this much information, but it is without loss of generality to induce them to do
so as the principal can commit to ignoring some of it. Formally, let Ei = ∪ti∈TiEi(ti) and
E = ∏i Ei. A mechanism is then a function P : T × E → ∆(A).
Given a mechanism P , ti ∈ Ti, (si, ei) ∈ Ti × Ei(ti), and (t−i, e−i) ∈ T−i × E−i, let
Ui(si, ei, t−i, e−i | ti, P ) =
∑
a
P (a | si, ei, t−i, e−i)ui(a, ti).
In words, this is agent i’s expected utility under mechanism P when her type is ti but
she reports type si, presents evidence ei, and expects all other agents to claim types t−i
and report evidence e−i.
A mechanism P is incentive compatible if for every agent i,
Et−iUi(ti,Mi(ti), t−i,M−i(t−i) | ti, P ) ≥ Et−iUi(si, ei, t−i,M−i(t−i) | ti, P ),
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for all si, ti ∈ Ti and all ei ∈ Ei(ti). In words, the agent prefers reporting her type truth-
fully and presenting maximal evidence to any other report and any other evidence she
has available given that all other agents report truthfully and present maximal evidence.
For mechanisms with evidence, it is useful to define a mapping giving the outcome
of the mechanism as a function of the type profile. In the literature on mechanism
design without evidence, there is no need to do so since, given truth–telling, a direct
mechanism is such a function. To be specific, given an incentive compatible mechanism
P , we say that the mechanism outcome is the function OP : T → ∆(A) defined by
OP (t)(a) = P (a | t,M(t)). In other words, the mechanism outcome gives the probability
distribution over A as a function of t which results when all agents report truthfully and
provide maximal evidence. The principal’s expected payoff from an incentive compatible
mechanism P is
Et
∑
a
P (a | t,M(t))v(a, t) = Et
∑
a
OP (t)(a)v(a, t).
Before defining robust incentive compatibility, we recall more standard notions. A
mechanism is ex post incentive compatible if for every agent i,
Ui(ti,Mi(ti), t−i,M−i(t−i) | ti, P ) ≥ Ui(si, ei, t−i,M−i(t−i) | ti, P ),
for all si, ti ∈ Ti, all t−i ∈ T−i, and all ei ∈ Ei(ti). That is, a mechanism is ex post
incentive compatible if each agent i has an incentive to report honestly and present
maximal evidence even if she knows the other agents’ types and that they are reporting
truthfully and presenting maximal evidence.
Say that a reporting strategy σi : Ti → Ti × Ei is feasible if whenever σi(ti) = (si, ei),
we have ei ∈ Ei(ti). A mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible if for every
agent i,
Et−iUi(ti,Mi(ti), σ−i(t−i) | ti, P ) ≥ Et−iUi(si, ei, σ−i(t−i) | ti, P )
for all si, ti ∈ Ti, all feasible σ−i : T−i → T−i × E−i, and all ei ∈ Ei(ti). That is, a
mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible if every type of every agent has a
dominant strategy to report honestly and present maximal evidence.
Neither of these notions of incentive compatibility implies the other. In an ex post
incentive compatible mechanism, an agent might want to deviate if she knew another
agent were going to report (si, ei) where ei 6= Mi(si). In a dominant strategy incentive
compatible mechanism, an agent could prefer to deviate if she knew the types of her
opponents. Our robustness notion combines the ex post and dominant strategy properties
above.
We say that a mechanism is robustly incentive compatible if for every agent i,
Ui(ti,Mi(ti), t−i, e−i | ti, P ) ≥ Ui(si, ei, t−i, e−i | ti, P ),
9
for all si, ti ∈ Ti, all t−i ∈ T−i, all e−i ∈ E−i, and all ei ∈ Ei(ti). In other words, even
if i knew the type and evidence reports of other agents, it would be optimal to report
truthfully and provide maximal evidence regardless of what those reports are. Robust
incentive compatibility implies ex post incentive compatibility and dominant strategy
incentive compatibility, but is not implied by either. See Part A of the Online Appendix
for details.
A robustly incentive compatible mechanism has the desirable property that it does
not rely on the principal knowing the beliefs of the agents about each other’s types or
strategies. Furthermore, the outcome of the mechanism need not change if the agents
report publicly and sequentially, rather than simultaneously, regardless of the order in
which they report.
Since robust incentive compatibility implies incentive compatibility, the best robustly
incentive compatible mechanism for the principal yields a weakly lower expected payoff
than the best incentive compatible mechanism. Under our assumptions, there is no
difference — there is an optimal incentive compatible mechanism for the principal which
is robustly incentive compatible.
A mechanism P is deterministic if for every (t, e) ∈ T × E , P (t, e) is a degenerate
distribution. In other words, for every report and presentation of evidence, the principal
chooses an a ∈ A without randomizing. Of course, randomization is an important feature
of optimal mechanisms in some settings. Under our assumptions, there is an optimal
mechanism which is deterministic.
2.4 Games
Our result that commitment is not needed says that an equilibrium of a particular game
between the principal and the agents has the same outcome as an optimal mechanism.
The interest in this result depends on the game. The game we consider seems natural
as it is just like the mechanism “game” in that the agents all make reports of types and
send evidence to the principal, after which he chooses an outcome. The difference from
the mechanism is that the principal is not committed to his response to these reports.
We refer to this as the game without commitment. Our robustness property implies that
the same result holds for a wide range of other games, such as games with sequential
reports instead of simultaneous.
Our result is not that the agents and principal use the same strategies in the game as
in the optimal mechanism. Fix the optimal (direct) mechanism and a profile of types t.
In the mechanism, given this profile, the agents will report t truthfully and will present
maximal evidence. The mechanism specifies a response to this, say a∗(t). In the game,
10
given this same profile of types t, the agents will send some reports, typically not truthful,
and some evidence, typically not maximal. Furthermore, the principal’s response to a
given profile of reports and evidence will not generally be what he would commit to in
the mechanism. For example, in the mechanism, he may commit to disregarding certain
evidence, something he cannot do in the equilibrium of the game.6
In the game, the principal reacts to the reports and evidence by forming a belief based
on the agents’ equilibrium strategies and choosing a best action for himself conditional
on these beliefs, say aˆ(t). The surprising result is that the equilibrium and optimal
mechanism we construct have the property that a∗(t) = aˆ(t) for every profile t.
Formally, the game without commitment is as follows. The strategy set for agent i, Σi,
is the set of functions σi : Ti → ∆(Ti × Ei) such that σi(si, ei | ti) > 0 implies ei ∈ Ei(ti).
That is, if agent i is type ti and puts positive probability on providing evidence ei, then
this evidence must be feasible for ti.
7 The principal’s strategy set, ΣP , is the set of
functions σP : T × E → ∆(A). A belief by the principal is a function µ : T × E → ∆(T )
giving the principal’s beliefs about t as a function of the profile of reports and evidence
presentation.
We study perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game without commitment. Our defi-
nition is the natural adaptation of Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1991) definition of perfect
Bayesian equilibrium for games with observed actions and independent types to allow
type–dependent sets of feasible actions. See Part B of the Online Appendix for details.
The equilibria of interest also satisfy a robustness property. We call a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (σ, µ) robust if for every i and every ti ∈ Ti, σi(si, ei | ti) > 0 implies
(si, ei) ∈ arg max
s′i∈Ti,e′i∈Ei(ti)
∑
a∈A
σP (a | s′i, e′i, s−i, e−i)ui(a, ti), ∀(s−i, e−i) ∈ T−i × E−i.
That is, σi(ti) is optimal for ti given any actions by the other agents and the equilibrium
strategy of the principal. A robust equilibrium generates an equilibrium in any of a
wide range of other games — for example, where agents report sequentially with each
agent observing the earlier reports. Similarly, there is no need for any agent to know the
preferences or evidence of other agents, even as a function of their types.
Given a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (σ, µ), the equilibrium outcome is the function
6While the agents’ strategies in the equilibrium differ from their strategies in the direct mechanism,
there is an indirect mechanism with the same outcome and the same strategies. Specifically, take the
indirect mechanism defined by having the principal commit to his equilibrium strategy of the game
without commitment. Clearly, it is an equilibrium of this mechanism for the agents to play the same
strategies as in the game without commitment, giving an indirect mechanism with the same outcome
and the same strategies by the agents.
7We do not require ti to report truthfully and do not require his claim of a type to be consistent with
the evidence he presents. That is, we could have σi(si, ei | ti) > 0 even though si 6= ti and ei /∈ Ei(si).
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O(σ,µ) : T → ∆(A) given by
O(σ,µ)(t)(a) =
∑
(s,e)∈T×E
∏
i
σi(si, ei | ti)σP (a | s, e).
In other words, analogously to the mechanism outcome, the equilibrium outcome gives the
probability distribution over A as a function of t generated by the equilibrium strategies.
Given (σ, µ), the principal’s expected utility is
Et
∑
a
O(σ,µ)(t)(a)v(a, t).
We show that there is a robust perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game (σ, µ) and an
optimal mechanism P with the same outcome — that is, such that OP (·) = O(σ,µ)(·). In
this sense, the principal does not need commitment.
The proof constructs an equilibrium from a set of I one–agent games which do not
depend on A or preferences over A. Specifically, we define the auxiliary game for agent
i as follows. There are two players, the principal and agent i. Agent i has type set Ti.
Type ti has action set Ti × Ei(ti). The principal has action set X ⊆ R where X is the
compact interval [minj mintj∈Tj vj(tj),maxj maxtj∈Tj vj(tj)]. The principal’s utility given
ti and x is −(x− vi(ti))2, while agent i’s payoff is{
x, if ti ∈ T+i ;
−x, otherwise.
In other words, the principal’s action, x, is his “estimate” of vi(ti). Positive types of the
agent prefer larger estimates of vi(ti) and negative types have the opposite preference. As
in the game without commitment, a strategy for agent i is a function σi : Ti → ∆(Ti×Ei)
with the property that σi(si, ei | ti) > 0 implies ei ∈ Ei(ti). We denote a strategy for the
principal as Xi : Ti × Ei → X. By strict concavity of the principal’s utility function in
x, he has a unique optimal pure strategy given any belief. Hence he will never mix in
equilibrium, so we only consider pure strategies for him.
To see the link between the auxiliary games and the game without commitment, recall
that the principal’s utility function is
∑
i ui(a)vi(ti). Hence, given some belief about each
ti, the principal maximizes the sum of the ui(a)’s weighted by his expectation of vi(ti). If
the principal’s belief about ti goes up in the sense of generating a higher expected value
of vi(ti), then his action choice changes in the direction of increasing ui(a). A positive
type is made better off by this, while a negative type is hurt. Hence positive types want
to persuade the principal that vi is large and negative types want him to believe it is
small, incentives captured by the auxiliary game.
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2.5 Results: Commitment, Determinism, and Robust Incentive
Compatibility
Our main results are stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If every ui exhibits simple type dependence, then there is an optimal incen-
tive compatible mechanism for the principal which is deterministic and robustly incentive
compatible. In addition, there is a robust perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game without
commitment with the same outcome as in this optimal mechanism. In this equilibrium,
agent i’s strategy is also a perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategy in the auxiliary game for
agent i.
Theorem 1 is proved in the Appendix. See Section 4 for a proof sketch.
These results tell us that we can use equilibrium analysis to characterize the optimal
mechanism. By Theorem 1, the outcome of the best perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the
principal in the game without commitment is the same as the the outcome of the best
mechanism for the principal. This identifies how the mechanism must respond to any
profile of type reports t when the evidence presented is the maximal evidence for t. To
finish identifying the optimal mechanism, we only need to specify its response to profiles
of type reports t some of which are accompanied by the “wrong” evidence.
Also, we can use the auxiliary games to identify the information revealed by the
agents in the game without commitment. From this, we can compute the best reply
of the principal, completing the specification of the equilibrium of the game without
commitment, an approach we illustrate in the next section.
3 Optimal Mechanisms with Dye Evidence
3.1 Characterizing the Optimal Mechanism
In this section, we show how one can use equilibria in the auxiliary games to characterize
optimal mechanisms with Dye’s (1985) evidence structure, a structure extensively studied
in the economics and accounting literatures. We also show that this characterization can
be used to characterize optimal mechanisms in a different setting. Specifically, we show
that in certain models without evidence but where the principal can verify the type of an
agent at a cost, the optimal mechanism can be computed from the optimal mechanism
for an associated Dye evidence model.
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We say the model has Dye evidence if for every i, for all ti ∈ Ti, either Ei(ti) = {Ti}
or Ei(ti) = {{ti}, Ti}. In other words, any given type either has no evidence in the sense
that she can only prove the trivial event Ti or has access to perfect evidence and can
choose between proving nothing (proving Ti) and proving her type. Let T
0
i denote the
set of ti ∈ Ti with Ei(ti) = {Ti}. We sometimes refer to these types as having no evidence
and types with Ei(ti) = {Ti, {ti}} as having evidence.
A complication is that the auxiliary games have multiple, essentially equivalent equi-
libria. Since type reports are cheap talk, any permutation of agent i’s type reports and
the principal’s interpretation of them yields another equilibrium. Note, though, that this
permutation does not affect the information the principal acquires about i’s type or his
choices given his information.
Given a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (σ∗i , X
∗
i ) of the auxiliary game for agent i, define
the equilibrium outcome to be the function Oi(σ∗i ,X∗i )
: Ti → ∆(R) given by8
Oi(σ∗i ,X∗i )(ti)(x) =
∑
(si,ei)∈Ti×Ei|X∗i (si,ei)=x
σ∗i (si, ei | ti).
Two equilibria of the auxiliary game are essentially equivalent if they generate the same
equilibrium outcome. If there is an equilibrium such that every other equilibrium is
essentially equivalent to it, the equilibrium is essentially unique.
First consider type–independent utility where ui(a, ti) is independent of ti for all i.
I.e., T−i = ∅, so ui(a, ti) = ui(a) for all ti.
The following builds on well–known characterizations of equilibria with Dye evidence.
Theorem 2. Given Dye evidence, for every i, there exists a unique v∗i such that
v∗i = Eti
[
vi(ti) | ti ∈ T 0i or vi(ti) ≤ v∗i
]
.
If T−i = ∅, there is an essentially unique equilibrium in the auxiliary game for i where
every type makes the same cheap–talk claim, say s∗i , and only types with evidence who
have vi(ti) > v
∗
i present (nontrivial) evidence. That is, type ti sends (s
∗
i , e
∗
i (ti)) with
probability 1 where
e∗i (ti) =
{
Ti, if ti ∈ T 0i or vi(ti) ≤ v∗i ;
{ti}, otherwise.
To see this, note first that cheap talk is not credible since every type wants the
principal to believe that vi is large. Also, if i can prove her type is ti, she wants to do
8Since each Ti is finite, the set of type reports and the set of events that can be proven are also finite.
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so only if vi(ti) is at least as large as what the principal would believe if she showed no
evidence. Thus types with evidence but lower values of vi(ti) pool with the types without
evidence, leading to an expectation of vi(ti) equal to v
∗
i .
In equilibrium, the principal’s expectation of vi(ti) is v
∗
i given a type who presents no
evidence and equals the true value otherwise. Let
vˆi(ti) =
{
v∗i , if ti ∈ T 0i or vi(ti) ≤ v∗i ;
vi(ti), otherwise.
For every vˆ = (vˆ1, . . . , vˆI) ∈ RI , let pˆ(· | vˆ) be any p ∈ ∆(A) maximizing∑
a∈A
p(a)
[
u0(a) +
∑
i
ui(a)vˆi
]
.
That is, pˆ(· | vˆ) is an optimal distribution over A for the principal when vˆ is his profile of
expectations of the vi’s. Then the equilibrium outcome of the game without commitment
is the function O(t)(a) = pˆ(a | vˆ(t)).
Corollary 1. With type–independent utility and Dye evidence, there is an optimal mech-
anism P with mechanism outcome OP (t) = pˆ(· | vˆ(t)). That is, with or without commit-
ment, the outcome selected by the principal when the profile of types is t is pˆ(· | vˆ(t)).
Corollary 1 yields characterizations of optimal mechanisms in many interesting cases.
Example 1. The simple allocation problem with Dye evidence. Here pˆ(i | t) > 0
iff vˆi(ti) = maxj vˆj(tj), so the good is given to an agent with the highest vˆj(tj).
One way to turn this outcome function into a specification of a mechanism yields a
favored–agent mechanism. P is a favored–agent mechanism if there is a threshold v∗ ∈ R
and an agent i, the favored agent, such that the following holds. First, if no agent j 6= i
proves that vj(tj) > v
∗, then i receives the good. Second, if some agent j 6= i does prove
that vj(tj) > v
∗, then the good is given to the agent who proves the highest vj(tj) (where
this may be agent i).
A favored–agent mechanism where the favored agent is any i satisfying v∗i = maxj v
∗
j
and the threshold v∗ is given by v∗i is an optimal mechanism. To see this, fix any t. By
definition, vˆj(tj) ≥ v∗j for all j. Hence if v∗i ≥ v∗j for all j, then vˆi(ti) ≥ v∗j for all j. Hence
for any j such that Ej(tj) = {Tj} or vj(tj) ≤ v∗j , we have vˆi(ti) ≥ v∗i ≥ v∗j = vˆj(tj). So if
every j 6= i satisfies this, it is optimal for the principal to give the good to i. Otherwise,
it is optimal for him to give it to any agent who proves the highest value.
As we discuss below, this mechanism is reminiscent of the favored–agent mechanism
discussed by Ben-Porath, Dekel, and Lipman (2014) (BDL) for the allocation problem
with costly verification.
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Example 2. The multi–unit allocation problem with Dye evidence. Suppose
the principal has K < I identical units to allocate and that he must allocate all of them.
Suppose each agent can have either 0 or 1 unit. Then the principal’s action is selecting
a set Iˆ ⊂ {1, . . . , I} of cardinality K specifying which agents get a unit. The principal’s
utility is
∑
i∈Iˆ vi(ti). Again, agent i’s utility is 0 if she does not get a unit and 1 if she
does. So the principal allocates units to the K agents with the highest values of vˆi(ti) as
computed above. One can interpret this as a recursive favored–agent mechanism.9
Example 3. Allocating a “bad.” Suppose the principal has to choose one agent to
carry out an unpleasant task (e.g., serve as department chair). This problem is equivalent
to having I − 1 goods to allocate since not receiving the assignment is receiving a good.
One can apply the analysis of the previous example for K = I − 1 to characterize the
optimal mechanism.
Turning to simple type dependence, consider the auxiliary game for i where some
types wish to persuade the principal that vi(ti) is large and others that vi(ti) is small.
Suppose that when the agent doesn’t prove her type, she makes a cheap talk claim either
that her type is positive (i.e., she wants the principal to think vi(ti) is large) or negative
(i.e., the reverse). Let v+i denote the principal’s belief about vi if i does not prove her
type but says it is positive and let v−i be the analog for a negative declaration. If v
+
i > v
−
i ,
then positive types prefer to truthfully report they are positive and similarly negative
types prefer truthful reporting. If i is a positive type with evidence, she will prove her
type only if vi(ti) > v
+
i , while a negative type with evidence will prove her type only if
vi(ti) < v
−
i . For this to be an equilibrium, we must have
v+i = Eti
[
vi(ti) | (ti ∈ T+i ∩ T 0i ) or (ti ∈ T+i \ T 0i and vi(ti) ≤ v+i )
]
and
v−i = Eti
[
vi(ti) | (ti ∈ T−i ∩ T 0i ) or (ti ∈ T−i \ T 0i and vi(ti) ≥ v−i )
]
.
Suppose this gives a unique v+i and v
−
i . If these values satisfy v
+
i < v
−
i , we can’t have such
an equilibrium as the positive types without evidence will imitate the negative and vice
versa. Hence all types who don’t present evidence must pool. (The pooling strategies are
described further in Lemma 1 and THeorem 3.) If v+i ≥ v−i , then these strategies form
an equilibrium. When v+i = v
−
i , the cheap talk does not convey any extra information,
so this is effectively the same as pooling. When v+i > v
−
i , cheap talk is useful, but there
is another equilibrium as well where cheap talk is treated as “babbling,” as in all models
with cheap talk.
The following lemma provides the background for the equilibrium characterization.
9Specifically, we allocate the first unit to the agent with the highest value of v∗i if no other agent
proves a higher value and to the agent with the highest proven value otherwise. After removing this
agent and unit, we follow the same procedure for the second unit, and so on. The agent with the highest
value of v∗i is the most favored agent in the sense that at least K agents must prove a value above her
v∗i for her to not get a unit, the agent with the second–highest v
∗
i is the second–most favored, etc.
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Lemma 1. With Dye evidence, for every i, there exists a unique v+i , v
−
i , and v
∗
i such
that
v+i = Eti
[
vi(ti) | (ti ∈ T+i ∩ T 0i ) or (ti ∈ T+i \ T 0i and vi(ti) ≤ v+i )
]
,
v−i = Eti
[
vi(ti) | (ti ∈ T−i ∩ T 0i ) or (ti ∈ T−i \ T 0i and vi(ti) ≥ v−i )
]
,
and
v∗i = Eti
[
vi(ti) | (ti ∈ T 0i ) or (ti ∈ T−i \ T 0i and vi(ti) ≥ v∗i ) or (ti ∈ T+i \ T 0i and vi(ti) ≤ v∗i )
]
.
Theorem 3. If v+i ≤ v−i , then there is an essentially unique equilibrium in the auxiliary
game for i. In this pure strategy equilibrium, there is a fixed type sˆi such that ti reports
(sˆi, e
∗
i (ti)) where
e∗i (ti) =
{
Ti, if ti ∈ T 0i or (ti ∈ T+i and vi(ti) ≤ v∗i ) or (ti ∈ T−i and vi(ti) ≥ v∗i );
{ti}, otherwise.
If v+i > v
−
i , there are two equilibria that are not essentially equivalent to one another
and every other equilibrium is essentially equivalent to one of the two. The first is the
same strategy profile as above. In the second equilibrium, there are types sˆ+i and sˆ
−
i with
sˆ+i 6= sˆ−i such that ti ∈ T ki sends (sˆki , eki (ti)), k ∈ {−,+}, where
e+i (ti) =
{
Ti, if ti ∈ T 0i or vi(ti) ≤ v+i ;
{ti}, otherwise,
and
e−i (ti) =
{
Ti, if ti ∈ T 0i or vi(ti) ≥ v−i ;
{ti}, otherwise.
When v+i > v
−
i , we can always compare the two equilibria for the principal and we
show that he prefers the one which separates the positive and negative types. Hence
this equilibrium corresponds to the optimal mechanism. We characterize the principal’s
beliefs about vi as a function of the true type ti along the equilibrium path, vˆi(ti), as
follows. If v+i > v
−
i , we let
vˆi(ti) =

v+i , if ti ∈ T 0i ∩ T+i or ti ∈ T+i \ T 0i and vi(ti) ≤ v+i ;
v−i , if ti ∈ T 0i ∩ T−i or ti ∈ T−i \ T 0i and vi(ti) ≥ v−i ;
vi(ti), otherwise.
If v+i ≤ v−i , let
vˆi(ti) =
{
vi(ti), if (ti ∈ T+i \ T 0i and vi(ti) ≥ v∗i ) or (ti ∈ T−i \ T 0i and vi(ti) ≤ v∗i );
v∗i , otherwise.
(1)
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For each t ∈ T and any v˜ = (v˜1, . . . , v˜I) ∈ RI , let pˆ(· | v˜) denote any p ∈ ∆(A)
maximizing ∑
a∈A
p(a)
[
u0(a) +
∑
i
ui(a, ti)v˜i
]
.
Then the equilibrium outcome of the game without commitment is the function O(t)(a) =
pˆ(a | vˆ(t)).
Corollary 2. In any model with simple type dependence and Dye evidence, there is an
optimal mechanism P with mechanism outcome OP (t) = pˆ(· | vˆ(t)). In other words, the
outcome selected by the principal when the profile of types is t is pˆ(· | vˆ(t)).
The only part of this result that does not follow from Theorems 1 and 3 is the claim
that when v+i > v
−
i , the better equilibrium for the principal is the one that separates the
positive and negative types. This is shown in Part C of the Online Appendix.
Example 4. The public–goods problem. Consider the public goods model from
Section 1. In equilibrium, given a profile of types t, the principal’s expectation of vi is
vˆi(ti) defined in equation (1). The principal provides the public good iff
∑
i vˆi(ti) > 0.
Again, this describes the optimal outcome function; the rest of the optimal mechanism
is straightforward.
While Example 1 above is reminiscent of Ben-Porath, Dekel, and Lipman’s (2014)
(BDL) analysis of allocation with costly verification, the optimal mechanism in Example
4 is reminiscent of the optimal mechanism under costly verification identified by Erlanson
and Kleiner (2017) which leads us to discuss this connection more generally.
3.2 Costly Verification
BDL (2014) and Erlanson and Kleiner (2017) model costly verification by assuming the
principal can pay a cost ci to “check” or learn the realization of agent i’s type, ti. The
agent cannot affect this process. By contrast, in the evidence model we consider here,
the principal cannot acquire information about an agent without inducing the agent to
reveal it.
Yet the optimal mechanisms in these papers look very similar to optimal mechanisms
with Dye evidence. Compare BDL’s optimal mechanism in the costly–verification version
of the simple allocation problem to the mechanism in Example 1. In both cases, there is
a favored agent and a threshold. If no non–favored agent “reports” above the threshold,
the favored agent receives the object. Here, “reporting above the threshold” means to
prove a value of vi(ti) above the threshold. In BDL, it means to make a cheap talk report
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of a type such that the type minus the checking cost is above the threshold. In both, if
some non–favored agent “reports” above the threshold, the good goes to the agent with
the highest such report. In the costly verification model, this is after checking this type.
Similarly, Erlanson and Kleiner consider the public goods model under costly verifi-
cation. In their mechanism and in the optimal mechanism here when v+i > v
−
i for all
i, we compute “adjusted reports” for each agent i given ti. In both cases, the adjusted
report for a positive type is max{v+i , vi(ti)}, while the adjusted report for a negative
type is min{v−i , vi(ti)} for certain cutoffs v+i and v−i . Again, the difference between these
scenarios is that the report is proven in the evidence model and is a cheap talk claim ad-
justed by the verification cost in the costly–verification model. In both problems, these
reports are summed to determine the principal’s optimal action. Again, this includes
some checking in the costly verification model.
We generalize to show that certain costly verification models can be rewritten as a
Dye evidence model, so that the optimal mechanism can be computed from our results
about mechanisms with evidence. In the text, we explain this for the simple allocation
problem. We give the general result and explain the connection to Erlanson and Kleiner in
Appendix C. This connection does not imply that all properties of evidence models, such
as the fact that the principal does not need commitment, carry over to costly verification
models.
So consider the simple allocation problem. For simplicity, assume vi(ti) > 0 for all
ti and all i and that no two types have the same value of vi(ti). Now agents do not
have evidence, but the principal can pay a cost ci > 0 to learn the type of agent i,
called checking i. BDL show that an optimal mechanism specifies functions p : T →
∆({1, . . . , I}) and qi : T → [0, 1] where p(t) is the probability distribution over which
agent the principal gives the good to and qi(t) gives the probability that the principal
checks i given type reports t. The principal’s objective function is
Et
[∑
i
pi(t)vi(ti)− qi(t)ci
]
where p(t) = (p1(t), . . . , pI(t)). The incentive compatibility constraints are
pˆi(ti) ≥ pˆi(t′i)− qˆi(t′i), ∀ti, t′i ∈ Ti, ∀i
where pˆi(ti) = Et−ipi(t) and qˆi(ti) = Et−iqi(t). To see this, note that if type ti reports
truthfully, he receives the good with expected probability pˆi(ti). If he misreports and
claims to be type t′i, he is checked with expected probability qˆi(t
′
i). In this case, the
principal learns he has lied and does not give him the good. Thus his probability of
receiving the good is the same as t′i’s probability minus the probability of being checked.
For each i, let t0i be the type with the smallest value of vi(ti). It is not hard to show
that the solution satisfies pˆi(ti) ≥ pˆi(t′i) if vi(ti) ≥ vi(t′i). Hence if incentive compatibility
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holds for type t0i , then it holds for every other type of agent i. So we can rewrite incentive
compatibility as
qˆi(t
′
i) ≥ pˆi(t′i)− pˆi(t0i ), ∀t′i ∈ Ti, ∀i.
The optimal solution sets qˆi as small as possible since checking is costly, so qˆi(ti) =
pˆi(ti)− pˆi(t0i ) for all ti. Hence the objective function is∑
i
Eti [pˆi(ti)vi(ti)− qˆi(ti)ci] =
∑
i
Eti
[
pˆi(ti)(vi(ti)− ci) + pˆi(t0i )ci
]
.
Thus we can solve the principal’s problem by choosing p to maximize the above subject
to pˆi(ti) ≥ pˆi(t0i ) for all ti ∈ Ti and all i. We can write the objective function as
∑
i
Eti [pˆi(ti)v˜i(ti)] = Et
[∑
i
pi(t)v˜i(ti)
]
where
v˜i(ti) =
{
vi(ti)− ci, if ti 6= t0i
vi(t
0
i )− ci + ciρi(t0i ) , if ti = t
0
i .
(Recall that ρi is the principal’s prior over Ti.)
This is the same objective function as for the simple allocation problem with Dye
evidence where the value to the principal of allocating the good to agent i is v˜i(ti).
Construct the evidence functions by assuming Ei(t0i ) = {Ti} and Ei(ti) = {{ti}, Ti} for
all ti 6= t0i . In this case, the incentive compatibility constraint is pˆi(ti) ≥ pˆi(t0i ), just as in
the costly verification model. We can apply our characterization of optimal mechanisms
with Dye evidence to obtain the solution to this problem. One can then “invert” the v˜i’s,
writing the soultion as a function of the vi’s, to give the solution for the costly verification
model.
Specifically, for each i, define the cutoffs v˜∗i from the v˜i functions as before — i.e., v˜
∗
i is
the expectation of v˜i conditional on ti not having evidence (type t
0
i ) or having v˜i(ti) ≤ v˜∗i .
As shown above, the optimal mechanism for this problem with evidence is to select a
favored agent who has v˜∗i ≥ v˜∗j for all j 6= i, set threshold v˜∗i , giving the good to i if
v˜j(tj) ≤ v˜∗i for all j 6= i and to that agent j who maximizes v˜j(tj) otherwise. It is easy
to show that this is equivalent to the optimal mechanism in BDL.
This approach yields optimal mechanisms with costly verification for Examples 2 and
3 and the model of Erlanson and Kleiner, as discussed in Appendix C.
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4 Understanding the Results
We provide intuition for our results in two ways. In Section 4.1, we sketch the proof of
Theorem 1 in the context of the simple allocation problem. In Section 4.2, we discuss
the roles our assumptions play in the results.
4.1 Proof Sketch for Simple Allocation Problem
One simplification in type–independent settings like the simple allocation problem is that
we can write a mechanism as a function only of type reports, where it is understood that
if i claims type ti, she also reports maximal evidence for ti, Mi(ti). If i claims type ti
but does not show evidence Mi(ti), type independence implies that the principal knows
the worst possible outcome for i — here, not giving her the good — and can use this to
punish. This deters any “obvious” deviations, leaving only more subtle deviations of the
form of reporting some si 6= ti and providing evidence Mi(si). So for this proof sketch, a
mechanism is a function P : T → ∆(A).
Fix an optimal mechanism P . The probability that type ti receives the good under
P is
pˆi(ti) = Et−iP (i | ti, t−i)
where action a = i is the action of the principal to give the good to agent i. Partition
each Ti according to equality under pˆi. I.e., for each α ∈ [0, 1], let
Tαi = {ti ∈ Ti | pˆi(ti) = α}.
Since Ti is finite, there are only finitely many values of α such that T
α
i 6= ∅. Unless stated
otherwise, any reference below to a Tαi set assumes this set is nonempty. Let Ti denote
the partition of Ti so defined and T the induced (product) partition of T . We call T the
mechanism partition.
Incentive compatibility is equivalent to the statement that Mi(si) ∈ Ei(ti) implies
pˆi(ti) ≥ pˆi(si). That is, if ti can imitate si in the sense that ti has available the maximal
evidence of si, then the mechanism must give the good to ti at least as often as si. Hence
if Mi(si) ∈ Ei(ti), ti ∈ Tαi , and si ∈ T βi , we must have α ≥ β.
A key observation is that without loss of generality, we can take the mechanism to be
measurable with respect to the mechanism partition T . While this property may seem
technical, it is the key to our results and is not generally true for models with more
general type dependence than we allow.
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To see why this property holds, suppose it is violated. In other words, suppose we
have a pair of types si, s
′
i ∈ Ti such that pˆi(si) = pˆi(s′i) but P is not measurable with
respect to {si, s′i}. That is, there is t−i ∈ T−i with P (· | si, t−i) 6= P (· | s′i, t−i). Consider
the alternative mechanism P ∗ which is identical to P unless i’s report is either si or s′i.
For either of these actions by i, P ∗ specifies the expected allocation generated by P . More
precisely, if q is the probability of type si conditional on {si, s′i}, then for every a ∈ A
and t−i ∈ T−i, we set
P ∗(a | si, t−i) = P ∗(a | s′i, t−i) = qP (a | si, t−i) + (1− q)P (a | s′i, t−i).
By assumption, the payoffs to agents j 6= i don’t depend on i’s type directly — they
are only affected by i’s type through its effect on the outcome chosen by the principal.
Since this change in the mechanism preserves the probability distribution over outcomes
from the point of view of these agents, their incentives are unaffected by this change.
So consider agent i. Her payoff from reporting anything other than si or s
′
i is un-
changed. The expected payoff from reporting si was pˆi(si) in the original mechanism,
while the expected payoff from reporting s′i was pˆi(s
′
i). The new mechanism “averages”
these two types together, so the probability i receives the good if she reports si is now
qpˆi(si) + (1 − q)pˆi(s′i). But since pˆi(si) = pˆi(s′i), the probability i receives the good if
she reports si does not change and similarly for s
′
i. Hence the expected payoff to i from
every action is the same under P and P ∗, so P ∗ must be incentive compatible.10
Finally, consider the principal. Recall that his utility function is
v(a, t) =
∑
j
uj(a)vj(tj).
Under the original mechanism, the principal’s expected payoff is
Et
∑
a
P (a | t)
∑
j
uj(a)vj(tj) =
∑
j
Etj
[
Et−j
∑
a
P (a | t)uj(a)
]
vj(tj).
But since uj(a) is 1 if a = j and 0 otherwise,
Et−j
∑
a
P (a | t)uj(a) = pˆj(tj),
so the principal’s expected payoff in the original mechanism is just
∑
j Etj pˆj(tj)vj(tj).
Since the probability tj receives the good is unchanged in the new mechanism for every
10More generally, suppose all types have the same indifference curves. Then if si is indifferent between
reporting si or claiming to be type s
′
i, s
′
i would also be indifferent between these reports. Hence neither
type’s payoff changes if we replace the response to either report with the averaged response. This is a
key implication of simple type dependence.
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j and every type tj ∈ Tj, the expected payoff of the principal is unchanged. Hence P ∗ is
also an optimal mechanism. Repeating as needed, we construct an optimal mechanism
which is measurable with respect to T .
This property is critical because we can construct an equilibrium of the game with-
out commitment where the principal obtains at least the information embodied in the
mechanism partition. Since the optimal mechanism is measurable with respect to this
partition, this means the principal receives enough information to carry out the optimal
mechanism. We construct such an equilibrium and use it to complete the proof.
Specifically, we use the auxiliary games to construct the equilibrium strategies. This
construction has four steps. First, we consider equilibria in the restricted auxiliary game
for i. In this game, type ti is restricted to sending evidence which is maximal for some
si in the same event of the mechanism partition as ti. That is, if si, ti ∈ Tαi for some α,
then in the restricted auxiliary game for i, ti can send evidence Mi(si) if Mi(si) ∈ Ei(ti).
For s′i /∈ Tαi , ti cannot send evidence Mi(s′i) even if Mi(s′i) ∈ Ei(ti). The principal’s
action in this game is the choice of a number x where his payoff is −(x− vi(ti))2 and the
agent i’s utility is x, as in the unrestricted case described above. In the restricted game,
the principal must learn at least that ti ∈ Tαi since, by construction, the only messages
available to ti reveal that ti ∈ Tαi .
Second, we show that given this information, the principal cannot do better than to
implement the outcome of the mechanism. More specifically, for each i, fix an equilibrium
of the restricted auxiliary game. For any ti ∈ Ti, ti’s equilibrium strategy in the restricted
game for i determines the principal’s equilibrium expected value of vi which we denote
vˆi(ti).
11 For a profile of types t, let vˆ(t) = (vˆ1(t1), . . . , vˆI(tI)). Typically, the evidence
presented will not reveal the type profile t, but must reveal at least the event of the
mechanism partition containing t and hence what the optimal mechanism specifies given
t. The second step is to show that for every type profile t, following the allocation
prescribed by the optimal mechanism for this type profile is optimal for the principal
when his expectation of v is vˆ(t). In this sense, the equilibrium does not give him
information he can use to improve on the mechanism.
To see this, suppose to the contrary that there is a strategy p∗ : RI → ∆(A) for
the principal as a function of the expected values vˆ which gives him a strictly higher
expected payoff than the optimal mechanism. Consider the following alternative mecha-
nism. Given reports (t,M(t)), the principal chooses the allocation p∗(vˆ(t)) with proba-
bility ε and the original mechanism P (· | t,M(t)) otherwise. If following the alternative
strategy yields the principal a strictly higher expected payoff than following the mech-
11If agent i’s equilibrium strategy in the restricted game is mixed, optimality for i requires that the
principal has the same belief in response to every pure strategy in the support. Hence the principal’s
belief in response to the equilibrium strategy of any type is unambiguously defined.
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anism, then this mechanism, if incentive compatible, yields a higher payoff than the
optimal mechanism. Since this is a contradiction, the new mechanism must not be in-
centive compatible.
But the new mechanism is incentive compatible. To see this, fix any si, ti ∈ Ti with
Mi(si) ∈ Ei(ti). By incentive compatibility of P , we must have pˆi(ti) ≥ pˆi(si). If this
inequality is strict, then for ε sufficiently small, ti prefers not to imitate si in the new
mechanism. So suppose pˆi(ti) = pˆi(s), so that ti and si are in the same event of the
mechanism partition. It is easy to show that Mi(si) ∈ Ei(ti) implies Ei(si) ⊆ Ei(ti).
Hence in the restricted auxiliary game, ti must get a weakly larger payoff than si. That
is, we must have vˆi(ti) ≥ vˆi(si). But then p∗ must give the good to ti at least as often as
si. Therefore, ti gets the good weakly more often than si in the new mechanism, so it is
incentive compatible, a contradiction.
This result also has implications for the optimal mechanism. Since the alternative
strategy p∗ must give the good to one of the agents with the highest expected vi, the
optimal mechanism must be doing the same. Otherwise, it would give the principal
a lower expected payoff. One implication of this is that if ti ∈ Tαi and si ∈ T βi for
α > β, then we must have vˆi(ti) ≥ vˆi(si). (Recall that Tαi is the set of ti who receive
the good with probability α in the optimal mechanism.). If vˆi(ti) < vˆi(si), then given
the information revealed by the restricted auxiliary game equilibria, the principal would
want to give the good to si at least as often as to ti. But the optimal mechanism gives
ti the good strictly more often and gets the same payoff as p
∗, so this can’t hold.
The third step is to show that by appropriately specifying beliefs in response to
evidence which has zero probability in the restricted auxiliary game, we obtain an equi-
librium of the unrestricted auxiliary game for i, where the payoffs are the same as in the
restricted game but where ti can send any evidence she possesses. Specifically, in the
unrestricted auxiliary game for i, if i presents evidence ei which is off path in the sense
that it is not presented by any type in equilibrium, then the principal responds by setting
x = minti|ei∈Ei(ti) vi(ti).
To see that this gives an equilibrium of the unrestricted auxiliary game, consider a
deviation by type ti to a message that was not available to her in the restricted game.
First, consider a deviation to evidence which is not chosen in the equilibrium of the
restricted auxiliary game by any type. Since ti could present Mi(ti) in the restricted
game, her equilibrium payoff must be at least minsi|Mi(ti)∈Ei(si) vi(si). Since Mi(ti) rules
out the largest number of types ti can rule out,
min
si|Mi(ti)∈Ei(si)
vi(si) ≥ min
si|ei∈Ei(si)
vi(si),
for any ei ∈ Ei(ti). Hence sending Mi(ti) yields a weakly higher payoff than any off path
evidence ti can send, so ti would not deviate to such evidence.
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So consider a deviation to evidence ti could not have used in the restricted game but
which is used in equilibrium by some other type, si. That is, if ti is in partition event
Tαi , then the deviation is to Mi(si) which is sent in equilibrium by type t
′
i where si need
not equal t′i. Since this is evidence ti could not have used in the restricted game, we must
have si and t
′
i in partition event T
β
i for β 6= α. Since ti can send si’s maximal evidence,
incentive compatibility implies α > β. As noted above, this implies vˆi(ti) ≥ vˆi(si), so ti
does not gain from the deviation.
The final step in constructing an equilibrium of the game without commitment is to
put the pieces together. Set the agents’ strategies and the principal’s beliefs to be those
in the equilibria of the unrestricted auxiliary games. Similar to the construction above,
for each vˆ = (vˆ1, vˆ2, . . . , vˆI), let a
∗(vˆ) select one of the agents with the highest vˆi to give
the good to. Given any reports t and the principal’s equilibrium expected values vˆ(t),
the principal’s strategy is a∗(vˆ(t)). Clearly, this strategy is sequentially rational for the
principal. To see that this gives a robust equilibrium, fix any reports by the agents other
than i. Obviously, the report for i which maximizes the principal’s expected value of
vi will maximize her probability of getting the good. But this means that i will follow
her equilibrium strategy, regardless of the reports of the other agents, giving us a robust
equilibrium.
Note that the outcome of this equilibrium is not necessarily the same as the outcome of
the optimal mechanism that was our starting point. However, the fact that the principal
receives at least the information he needs to follow the optimal mechanism implies that
his payoff in this equilibrium must be at least that in the optimal mechanism. Since it
cannot be strictly larger, we see that the principal’s payoff in this equilibrium is the same
as in the optimal mechanism.
Hence if the principal commits to the strategy he uses in this equilibrium, we obtain
an indirect mechanism with the same payoff as the equilibrium. As in the standard
mechanism design model, it is not difficult to turn this into a direct mechanism with the
same outcome. Note that the principal’s strategy is deterministic in the equilibrium (both
on and off the equilibrium path) and hence the implied mechanism is deterministic. It is
also not hard to see that the robustness of the equilibrium implies that the mechanism
is robustly incentive compatible.
4.2 Role of Assumptions
In this subsection, we explain the roles of our assumptions in generating the results. Part
D of the Online Appendix illustrates these points with examples showing which results
fail when we drop various assumptions.
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First, consider the robustness properties. These properties say that each agent’s
optimal strategy does not depend on the other agents’s types or behavior. Clearly,
the independence of types across agents and the private–values assumption that agent
i’s utility depends only on ti and a play important roles. If types are correlated, it
will be optimal for the principal to use reports by one agent to help enforce incentive
compatibility for others, so each agent’s optimal strategy will depend on her beliefs about
the others. Similarly, if an agent’s utility depend on the types of other agents, her optimal
strategy will depend on her beliefs about their types.
The functional form of the principal’s utility function is also important for robustness.
Given any belief about the types of the agents, the principal will choose a to maximize a
weighted sum of the ui(a)’s with weights given by the expectations of the vi(ti)’s. This
implies that if the principal’s expectation of vi(ti) increases, his optimal action changes in
the direction of increasing ui(a). Thus agent i’s incentives to signal about her type depend
only on her preferences regarding the principal’s expectation of vi(ti), independently of
his beliefs about the types of the other agents. Without this, robustness is unlikely: if
what agent i wants the principal to believe about ti depends on the principal’s beliefs
about t−i, then i’s optimal strategy depends on her beliefs about the other agents.
To clarify, the change in i’s utility from changing the principal’s beliefs about ti de-
pends on the principal’s beliefs about t−i. For example, in the simple allocation problem,
whether an increase in the principal’s expectation of vi(ti) changes i’s utility depends on
the beliefs about the other agents. However, while the magnitude of the change in utility
depends on the principal’s beliefs about t−i, the sign does not. Thus for a positive type
of i, increasing the principal’s expectation of vi has a positive effect for all t−i.
Except for the private values assumption, our assumptions on the form of the agent’s
utility are not essential for robustness. For example, suppose the principal’s set of feasible
actions A is a product space A1×. . .×AI . Write a typical action a ∈ A as a = (a1, . . . , aI)
where agent i’s utility depends only on her type and ai and the principal’s utility function
is
∑
i vi(ai, ti). In this case, we effectively have I different principal–agent problems and
robust incentive compatibility will not cost the principal anything, regardless of what
else we assume about the agents’ utility functions.
Simple type dependence and our assumptions on the principal’s utility function are
both important for our result that commitment is not necessary. Conceptually, we can
separate this result into two pieces. First, along the equilibrium path of the game without
commitment, the principal finds it optimal to implement the outcome of the optimal
mechanism. Second, there are beliefs for the principal off the equilibrium path which
make it sequentially rational for him to choose outcomes which deter such deviations by
the agents. Simple type dependence plays an important role in both parts.
For the first part, consider the one–agent case and contrast our analysis with the
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classical indifference curve analysis of a mechanism design problem as in Mas-Colell,
Whinston, and Green’s (1995) treatment of principal–agent models with adverse selec-
tion. In the classical analysis, one uses differences in the indifference curves for high and
low types to identify incentive compatible allocations and then the principal optimizes
over these. With simple type dependence, all types have the same indifference curves,
so this approach doesn’t work. If incentive compatibility were driven by differences in
indifference curves, we would not obtain our result in general. To see why, consider
the two–type case. Suppose, as in the classical adverse selection problem, the optimal
mechanism gives the two types different allocations and that the incentive compatibility
constraint is binding only for one type. That is, type t (omitting subscripts as we have
one agent) is indifferent between the allocation for t and for t′ and the constraint binds
in the sense that the allocation for t′ is not first–best. Then commitment is necessary.
Without commitment, there is no game where the principal learns which type he is fac-
ing (necessary to choose different allocations for the two types) and does not choose the
first–best allocation for type t′.
When indifference curves are the same and incentive compatibility is achieved by
evidence, this situation cannot arise. If two types are given different allocations in the
optimal mechanism, it cannot be true that one is indifferent between these allocations
and the other type is not. If both types are indifferent between the two allocations,
as our proof shows, our assumptions on the principal’s utility function implies that he
obtains the same payoff from giving the “expected allocation” to both types and so does
not need to separate them. If both types are not indifferent, there are two possibilities.
First, suppose they have the same preferences — either both are positive or both negative.
In this case, the type with the better allocation must have evidence the other type lacks.
This use of evidence to separate the types is equally available in a mechanism or a
game. Second, suppose one type is positive and the other negative. Then they have the
opposite preferences regarding these allocations. If each strictly prefers the allocation she
gets, it is easy to separate them, either in a mechanism or in equilibrium. If each type
strictly prefers the other’s allocation, it must be that each has evidence unavailable to
the other which can be used to separate them, evidence which again is equally available
in a mechanism or a game.
Simple type dependence also allows us to address off path behavior. For intuition,
first, consider the simpler case of type independence. When the utility functions of the
agents do not depend on their types, the principal knows how to punish deviations. To
prevent deviations while maintaining sequential rationality, choose the principal’s beliefs
off path to be those beliefs consistent with the evidence presented for which his best reply
is the worst possible for the agent who deviated. Since the principal’s actions on path
are optimal for him given some beliefs, this generates off path behavior which punishes
deviations.
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Simple type dependence is more complicated, since the inferences which hurt positive
types help negative types, making it harder to select off path beliefs to deter deviations.
But this restricts both mechanisms and games. To see the intuition, suppose there is
only one agent with two types, t′ and t′′, where t′ is positive and t′′ is negative. Fix any
report and evidence, say (t¯, e¯) which is a deviation from equilibrium and is feasible for
both types, so that we need to select a belief for the principal. Let a(t) denote the action
played by the principal in the proposed equilibrium (and, because we’re assuming the
only issue at stake is off path behavior, in the mechanism) as a function of the agent’s
type t. Since the types separate in the mechanism, we have a(t′) 6= a(t′′). Let a∗ be
the response to (t¯, e¯) in the mechanism. Since the mechanism is incentive compatible, it
must be true that ui(a(t
′)) ≥ ui(a∗) ≥ ui(a(t′′)). But this means we can construct the
equilibrium to have the principal infer from (t¯, e¯) that the agent is type t′ and choose
action a(t′). This ensures sequential rationality and deters the deviation by either type.
5 Connection to the Literature
In this section, we give details on how our results relate to the literature. Green and
Laffont (1986) began the literature on mechanism design with evidence. We make use of
results in Bull and Watson (2007) and Deneckere and Severinov (2008). Below, we discuss
in more detail a particularly relevant part of this literature which identifies conditions
under which the principal does not need commitment to obtain the same outcome as
under the optimal mechanism, a result first shown by Glazer and Rubinstein (2004,
2006) and extended by Sher (2011) and Hart, Kremer, and Perry (2016, 2017).
The first papers on games with evidence are Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981).
We make particular use of Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988).12 More recent pa-
pers of interest on this topic include Hagenbach, Koessler, and Perez-Richet (2014) and
Guttman, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2014). The papers most closely related to our appli-
cation to costly verification models are BDL (2014) and Erlanson and Kleiner (2017).
Our results on robust incentive compatibility are related to earlier results on dominant
strategy incentive compatible mechanisms without evidence. Manelli and Vincent (2010)
and Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu, and Shi (2013) show that in certain settings
with transfers and quasi–linear utility, every incentive compatible allocation is equivalent
(yields the same interim utilities for all types of all agents) to a dominant strategy
incentive compatible allocation. In Part E of the Online Appendix, we show how their
approach can be adapted to our setting to provide an alternative, though more complex,
proof of our result that robust incentive compatibility is costless for the principal.
12See also Farrell (1986) which appears to have developed essentially the same model independently.
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We extend the earlier results that commitment is not necessary in the one–agent
setting in several ways. First, we consider multiple agents. Second, because we have
multiple agents, we can consider robustness with respect to agents’ beliefs about other
agents, an issue absent in the one–agent setting. Third, our characterization of the
equilibrium strategies is novel.
Even when we restrict our analysis to the one–agent case, our results are not nested
by the previous literature. Most significantly, all previous results assume the agent’s
preferences are independent of her type, while we allow simple type–dependence. To
clarify, for the remainder of this discussion, we consider the one–agent case, so t is the
type of the single agent, T her set of types, and u her utility function.
Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), the first to show a result of this form, used weaker
assumptions on evidence as they did not assume normality. However, they assumed
that the principal only had two actions available and the agent’s preference was type–
independent. By contrast, in the one–agent, two–action case, our assumption of simple
type–dependence is without loss of generality.
Sher (2011) generalizes Glazer–Rubinstein by assuming type–independent utility for
the agent and that the principal’s utility can be written as a concave function of the
agent’s utility. In the one–agent version of our model, the principal’s utility function
is v(a, t) = u0(a) + v(t)u(a). Since this depends on a directly, not just through u(a),
even the type–independent version of our model is not nested by (nor does it nest) Sher’s
assumptions. In particular, if the agent is indifferent between a and aˆ, Sher’s assumptions
require the principal to be indifferent given any t, a restriction we do not impose.
Hart, Kremer, and Perry (2016, 2017), like us, assume normality. Unlike us, they
assume type–independent utility for the agent. Hart, Kremer, and Perry (2017) assume
that the principal cannot randomize. In addition, they weaken Sher’s concavity assump-
tion to the property that for each t ∈ T , the principal’s utility function over A can
be written as v(a, t) = ϕt(u(a)) where
∑
t µ(t)ϕt is single–peaked (equivalently, strictly
quasi–concave) for any µ ∈ ∆(T ). Because we allow the principal’s utility to depend on
a directly, our model violates this assumption for the same reasons our model violates
Sher’s assumption. Also, we prove that the principal does not need to randomize.
Hart, Kremer, and Perry (2016) allow the principal to randomize. Their main as-
sumption states that if we fix any indifference curve for the agent, then there is a point
on that indifference curve which is best for the principal independently of t. In the one–
agent version of our model, we have v(a, t) = u0(a) + u(a)v(t). Hence holding fixed
the agent’s utility, for any t, the best lottery over a is any p on the indifference curve
which maximizes
∑
a p(a)u0(a). Thus except for the type–dependence we allow, in the
one–agent case, our assumptions are nested in their model.
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Hart, Kremer, and Perry (2017) also give a refinement of equilibrium in the disclosure
game that identifies the principal’s best equilibrium. Our result that the principal’s best
equilibrium in the game without commitment can be found using I one–agent disclosure
games is analogous in that it also provides a means to understand this equilibrium.
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Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 1
For each i, let Ri ≡ Ti × Ei. Given a mechanism P and ri ∈ Ri, let
Uˆi(ri;P ) = Et−i
∑
a
P (a | ri, t−i,M−i(t−i))ui(a).
The Revelation Principle for this class of problems says we can restrict attention to
equilibria where each ti sends ri = (ti,Mi(ti)). Hence Uˆi(ri;P ) is the expected utility of
ti from report ri if ti is a positive type and minus the expected utility if ti is a negative
type.
Throughout, we fix an optimal mechanism P . For each α ∈ R, let
Rαi = {ri ∈ Ri | Uˆi(ri;P ) = α}.
Finiteness of Ti implies that Ei is finite and hence Ri is finite. References to Rαi below
assume this set is nonempty unless stated otherwise. The nonempty Rαi ’s form a partition
of Ri, called the mechanism partition for i, denoted {Rαi }. The product partition of R
formed by the cells
∏
iR
αi
i is the mechanism partition, denoted {
∏
iR
αi
i }. Let
Tαi = {ti ∈ Ti | Uˆi(ti,Mi(ti);P ) = α} = {ti ∈ Ti | (ti,Mi(ti)) ∈ Rαi }.
Lemma 2. P is incentive compatible iff the following holds for every (si, ei) ∈ Rαi and
(ti,Mi(ti)) ∈ Rβi . (i) If ti ∈ T+i and α > β, then ei /∈ Ei(ti). (ii) If ti ∈ T−i and β > α,
then ei /∈ Ei(ti).
Proof. Immediate.
Lemma 3. Without loss of generality, P has the property that for all i, if (si, ei) ∈ Rαi ,
then there exists ti ∈ Tαi with ei ∈ Ei(ti). Hence if Rαi 6= ∅, then Tαi 6= ∅.
Proof. Suppose (si, ei) ∈ Rαi . By Lemma 2, for any ti ∈ T βi with ei ∈ Ei(ti), we have
β ≥ α if ti ∈ T+i and β ≤ α if ti ∈ T−i . Thus if there is no ti ∈ Tαi with ei ∈ Ei(ti),
we can move (si, ei) to the smallest β > α with ti ∈ T+i and ei ∈ Ei(ti) or to the largest
β < α with ti ∈ T−i and ei ∈ Ei(ti) and will preserve incentive compatibility and the
principal’s expected payoff. We carry out this move by changing the mechanism so that
P (· | si, ei, t−i, e−i) = P (· | ti,Mi(ti), t−i, e−i) for all (t−i, e−i) ∈ R−i for the chosen ti.
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Lemma 4. Without loss of generality, P is measurable with respect to the mechanism par-
tition for each i, {Rαi }, in the sense that if (si, ei), (s′i, e′i) ∈ Rαi , then P (· | si, ei, t−i, e−i) =
P (· | s′i, e′i, t−i, e−i) for all (t−i, e−i) ∈ R−i. Hence P is measurable with respect to the
mechanism partition {∏iRαii } in the sense that P (· | s, e) = P (· | s′, e′) if (s, e), (s′, e′) ∈∏
iR
αi
i .
Proof. Suppose P is not measurable with respect to the mechanism partition for some i.
We construct an incentive compatible mechanism which is measurable and has the same
payoff for the principal as P . Fix i and α such that Rαi 6= ∅. By Lemma 3, Tαi 6= ∅.
Define a mechanism P ∗ by
P ∗(· | si, ei, t−i, e−i) =
{
P (a | si, ei, t−i, e−i), if (si, ei) /∈ Rαi ,
Eti(P (a | ti,Mi(ti), t−i, e−i) | (ti,Mi(ti)) ∈ Rαi ), otherwise.
The expected payoff to any type tj of agent j 6= i from any report is the same in P and
P ∗. So incentive compatibility of P implies incentive compatibility of P ∗ for j 6= i.
For agent i for (si, ei) ∈ Rαi , we have
Uˆi(si, ei;P ∗) = Et−i
[∑
a
P ∗(a | si, ei, t−i,M−i(t−i))ui(a)
]
= Et−i
[∑
a
Eti [P (a | ti,Mi(ti), t−i,M−i(t−i)) | (ti,Mi(ti)) ∈ Rαi ]ui(a)
]
= Eti
[
Et−i
(∑
a
P (a | ti,Mi(ti), t−i,M−i(t−i))ui(a)
)
| (ti,Mi(ti)) ∈ Rαi )
]
= Eti [α | (ti,Mi(ti)) ∈ Rαi ]
= α = Uˆi(si, ei;P ).
So every ti receives the same expected payoff from every report in P and P
∗, so incentive
compatibility of P implies incentive compatibility of P ∗. Also, P ∗ gives the principal
the same expected payoff as P . Hence P ∗ is an optimal mechanism. Iterating gives an
optimal mechanism measurable with respect to the mechanism partition for i; iterating
over i gives an optimal mechanism measurable with respect to the mechanism partition.
Note that the principal’s expected payoff is linear in the expected values of the vi’s.
The following lemma gives a standard but useful implication regarding optimal actions.
Lemma 5. Let
U = {(u¯0, u¯1, . . . , u¯I) ∈ RI+1 | ∃p ∈ ∆(A) with
∑
a
p(a)ui(a) = u¯i, ∀i}.
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Given any belief of the principal over each Ti, let vˆi denote the expectation of vi(ti) and
let vˆ = (1, vˆ1, . . . , vˆI). Let U∗(vˆ) denote the set of u ∈ U maximizing the principal’s
expected utility, vˆ · u. Suppose v and v′ satisfy vi > v′i and v′j = vj for j 6= i. Then for
any u ∈ U∗(v) and u′ ∈ U∗(v′), we have ui ≥ u′i.
Proof. Standard.
We now construct an equilibrium for the game without commitment which yields the
same payoff for the principal as P . The strategy for agent i in this equilibrium is the
same as i’s strategy in an equilibrium of the auxiliary game for i. The auxiliary game
for i is a two–player game between i and the principal. i has a set of types Ti where
the prior over Ti is the same as in the mechanism design problem. If i is type ti, then
her set of feasible actions is Zi(ti) ≡ Ti × Ei(ti). The principal’s set of feasible actions
is X = [minj mintj∈Tj vj(tj),maxj maxtj∈Tj vj(tj)]. The game is sequential. First, agent i
learns her type ti ∈ Ti. Then she chooses an action zi ∈ Zi(ti). The principal observes
this action and chooses x ∈ X. If i’s type is ti and the principal chooses action x, then
the principal’s payoff is −(x− vi(ti))2, while i’s payoff is{
x, if ti ∈ T+i ;
−x, otherwise.
Denote a (behavioral) strategy for i in this game by σi(· | ti), a function from Ti to
∆(Zi(ti)). Let the principal’s belief be denoted qi : Ti × Ei → ∆(Ti). The principal’s
strategy for the game is denoted Xi : Ri → X.
We construct an equilibrium of the auxiliary game for i via the restricted auxiliary
game. In the restricted game, type ti can only choose actions in R
α
i where α is the unique
α such that ti ∈ Tαi . That is, ti’s strategy set is Zi(ti)∩Rαi . Note that every (si, ei) ∈ Ri
is contained in at least one Zi(ti) ∩Rαi by Lemma 3.
Fix i and a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (σ∗i , X
∗
i , q
∗
i ) of the restricted auxiliary game
for i.13 Sequential rationality for the principal implies that X∗i (si, ei) =
∑
ti∈Ti vi(ti)q
∗
i (ti |
si, ei), the expectation of vi(ti) given the belief q
∗
i .
Let Xˆ∗i (ti) denote the action chosen by the principal in equilibrium when i is type ti.
That is, Xˆ∗i : Ti → X and is given by
Xˆ∗i (ti) = X
∗
i (si, ei), for some (si, ei) ∈ supp(σ∗i (· | ti)).
13To see that such an equilibrium must exist, consider the game where i is restricted to putting
probability ε > 0 on each of her pure strategies. By standard results, this game has a Nash equilibrium.
As ε ↓ 0 (taking subsequences as needed), these strategies converge to a Nash equilibrium of the restricted
auxiliary game by upper hemicontinuity of the Nash equilibrium correspondence. These strategies and
the limiting beliefs for the principal must also be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium since the principal’s
limiting strategy must be optimal given his limiting belief.
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Because the principal’s payoff function is strictly concave in his action, he always uses a
pure strategy. Since ti’s payoff is either strictly increasing or strictly decreasing in the
principal’s actions, ti is never indifferent between two distinct actions by the principal.
Hence every message in the support of ti’s mixed strategy must lead to the same response
by the principal. Thus the definition above is unambiguous. For this to be an equilibrium,
we require
Xˆ∗i (ti) = max
(si,ei)∈Zi(ti)∩Rαi
X∗i (si, ei), ∀ti ∈ T+i
Xˆ∗i (ti) = min
(si,ei)∈Zi(ti)∩Rαi
X∗i (si, ei), ∀ti ∈ T−i .
By construction, if ti ∈ Tαi , then ti can only send (si, ei) ∈ Rαi in the restricted
auxiliary game. Hence in any equilibrium of this game, the principal at least learns
the event of the mechanism partition for i that ti lies in. Since the optimal mechanism
is measurable with respect to the mechanism partition, this means that the principal
has enough information to carry out the optimal mechanism. On the other hand, the
principal may learn more than just that ti ∈ Tαi in the equilibrium. The following lemma
shows that this extra information, if any, cannot be useful for the principal.
Lemma 6. For each i, fix any equilibrium of the restricted auxiliary game for i. Then
for every t ∈ T ,
P (· | t,M(t)) ∈ arg max
p∈∆(A)
∑
a
p(a)
I∑
i=0
ui(a)Xˆ
∗
i (ti).
In other words, given the belief formed by the principal in the equilibria at profile t, it is
optimal for him to follow the optimal mechanism.
Proof. For each (α1, . . . , αI) such that each T
αi
i 6= ∅, P (· | t,M(t)) is constant over
t ∈ ∏i Tαii . Given any t ∈ ∏i Tαii , the equilibria from the auxiliary games give the
principal at least as much information as the fact that t ∈∏i Tαii , so we must have
max
p∈∆(A)
∑
a
p(a)
∑
i
ui(a)Xˆ
∗
i (ti) ≥
∑
a
P (a | t,M(t))
∑
i
ui(a)Xˆ
∗
i (ti), ∀t ∈ T.
The claim is that this holds with equality for all t. Suppose, to the contrary, that the
inequality is strict for some t.
For each vˆ = (1, vˆ1, . . . , vˆI) ∈ RI+1, let p˜(· | vˆ) denote any p(·) ∈ ∆(A) which
maximizes
∑
a p(a)
∑I
i=0 ui(a)vˆi. In other words, p˜(· | vˆ) is an optimal p for the principal
given any beliefs over T such that vˆi is the expected value of vi(ti). So we have∑
a
p˜(a | Xˆ∗i (ti))
∑
i
ui(a)Xˆ
∗
i (ti) ≥
∑
a
P (a | t,M(t))
∑
i
ui(a)Xˆ
∗
i (ti)
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for all t ∈ T , strictly so for some t. We complete the proof by using this to construct a
mechanism superior to the optimal mechanism, a contradiction.
Given any (si, ei) ∈ Rαii , let
vˆi(si, ei) =
{
Xˆ∗i (si), if ei = Mi(si);
X∗i (si, ei), otherwise.
That is, vˆi(si, ei) is the equilibrium belief type si induces in the restricted auxiliary
game if ei is maximal evidence for si; otherwise, it is the equilibrium belief the principal
has in the restricted auxiliary game in response to report and evidence (si, ei). This
construction is needed so that each type will be induced to report truthfully and provide
maximal evidence in the mechanism in order to mimic the equilibrium. We need this to,
in effect, turn an indirect mechanism into a direct mechanism.
Given (s, e) ∈ ∏iRi, let vˆ(s, e) = (vˆ1(s1, e1), . . . , vˆI(sI , eI)). Fix a small ε > 0 and
define a new mechanism P ∗ by
P ∗(· | s, e) = εp˜(· | vˆ(s, e)) + (1− ε)P (· | s, e).
To show that P ∗ is incentive compatible, fix ti ∈ Ti and (si, ei) such that ei ∈ Ei(ti). If
ti strictly prefers reporting (ti,Mi(ti)) to reporting (si, ei) under P , then for ε sufficiently
small, ti still has this strict preference.
14
So suppose that ti is indifferent between reporting (ti,Mi(ti)) and reporting (si, ei)
under P , so (ti,Mi(ti)) and (si, ei) are in the same event of the mechanism partition for i.
Since ti is indifferent between these two reports under P , she prefers reporting (ti.Mi(ti))
under P ∗ iff she prefers reporting (ti,Mi(ti)) under p(· | vˆ(s, e)). That is, if ti ∈ T+i , ti
prefers reporting (ti,Mi(ti)) to reporting (si, ei) under P
∗ iff
Et−i
[∑
a
p˜(a | Xˆ∗i (ti), Xˆ∗−i(t−i))ui(a)
]
≥ Et−i
[∑
a
p˜(a | X∗i (si, ei), Xˆ∗−i(t−i))ui(a)
]
. (2)
If X∗i (si, ei) = Xˆ
∗
i (ti), this holds with equality. So suppose X
∗
i (si, ei) 6= Xˆ∗i (ti). Since
(si, ei) and (ti,Mi(ti)) are in the same event of the mechanism partition, (si, ei) is a
feasible report for ti in the restricted auxiliary game. Hence the fact that ti ∈ T+i implies
Xˆ∗i (ti) > X
∗
i (si, ei). By Lemma 5, this implies∑
a
p˜(a | Xˆ∗i (ti), vˆ−i)ui(a) ≥
∑
a
p˜(a | X∗i (si, ei), vˆ−i)ui(a),
14This argument requires finiteness of each Ti. We conjecture that a more complex argument could
substitute in the case where some Ti are infinite.
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for all vˆ−i, implying that (2) holds.
A similar argument for ti ∈ T−i completes the proof that P ∗ is incentive compatible.
But then P ∗ is an incentive compatible mechanism giving the principal a strictly higher
payoff than P , a contradiction.
Lemma 7. Fix α > β such that Tαi 6= ∅ and T βi 6= ∅ and any equilibrium of the restricted
auxiliary game for i. Then for every ti ∈ Tαi and t′i ∈ T βi , we have Xˆ∗i (ti) ≥ Xˆ∗i (t′i).
Proof. Since α > β, there exists tˆ−i ∈ T−i such that
uαi ≡
∑
a
P (a | ti,Mi(ti), tˆ−i,M−i(tˆ−i))ui(a) >
∑
a
P (a | t′i,Mi(t′i), tˆ−i,M−i(tˆ−i))ui(a) ≡ uβi .
By Lemma 6, pα ≡ P (· | ti,Mi(ti), tˆ−i,M−i(tˆ−i)) maximizes over p(·) ∈ ∆(A)
∑
a
p(a)
[
ui(a)Xˆ
∗
i (ti) +
∑
j 6=i
uj(a)Xˆ
∗
j (tˆj)
]
and pβ defined analogously maximizes the analog for t′i. Hence by Lemma 5, u
α
i > u
β
i
implies Xˆ∗i (ti) ≥ Xˆ∗i (t′i).
We complete the proof in two steps. First, we show how to modify an equilibrium
of the restricted auxiliary game for i to construct an equilibrium of the unrestricted
auxiliary game for i with the same equilibrium path. Second, we use these equilibria to
construct a robust equilibrium of the game without commitment and an optimal mech-
anism which is deterministic, robustly incentive compatible, and has the same outcome
as the equilibrium.
Lemma 8. For any i and any equilibrium of the restricted auxiliary game for i, there is
an equilibrium of the unrestricted auxiliary game where i follows the same strategy.
Proof. Let (σ∗i , X
∗
i , q
∗
i ) be an equilibrium of the restricted auxiliary game for i. Fix any
any (s¯i, e¯i) ∈ Rβi . Let F denote the set of types for whom (s¯i, e¯i) is feasible — that is,
F = {ti | e¯i ∈ Ei(ti)}. We show that for any t¯i ∈ Tαi ∩F with σ∗(s¯i, e¯i | t¯i) = 0, t¯i weakly
prefers her equilibrium strategy to (s¯i, e¯i). That is, Xˆ
∗
i (t¯i) ≥ X∗i (s¯i, e¯i) if ti ∈ T+i and the
reverse inequality for ti ∈ T−i . Clearly, if α = β, the fact that t¯i did not have a profitable
deviation in the restricted game implies that she does not wish to deviate to (s¯i, e¯i) in
the unrestricted game, so we only consider α 6= β.
First, suppose (s¯i, e¯i) has positive probability in equilibrium. That is, there is another
t′i with σ
∗
i (s¯i, e¯i | t′i) > 0, so X∗i (s¯i, e¯i) = Xˆ∗i (t′i). For any t¯i ∈ T+i ∩ F , incentive
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compatibility implies β < α. By Lemma 7, this implies Xˆi(t¯i) ≥ Xˆ∗i (t′i) = X∗i (s¯i, e¯i), so
t¯i has no incentive to deviate. A similar argument applies to all t¯i ∈ T−i .
So suppose (s¯i, e¯i) has zero probability in equilibrium. Let tˆi minimize Xˆ
∗
i (tˆi) over
ti ∈ T+i ∩ F . Clearly, if Xˆ∗i (tˆi) ≥ X∗i (s¯i, e¯i), then we do not need to consider positive
types further. Suppose, then, that Xˆ∗i (s¯i, e¯i) > Xˆ
∗
i (tˆi).
We claim that there must be some t′i ∈ F with Xˆ∗i (tˆi) ≥ vi(t′i). If not, then tˆi could
send Mi(tˆi) in the restricted auxiliary game, an option which must be feasible, and prove
at least as much as e¯i. This would generate a belief over t
′
i ∈ F which would have an
expected value strictly larger than Xˆ∗i (tˆi), a contradiction.
So change the principal’s beliefs in response to (s¯i, e¯i) to λq
∗
i (s¯i, e¯i)+(1−λ)δt′i where δt′i
is the degenerate distribution putting probability 1 on t′i. Choose λ so that the expected
value of vi(ti) under this belief is Xˆ
∗
i (tˆi). Change the principal’s strategy to reply to
(s¯i, e¯i) with x = Xˆ
∗
i (tˆi). With this change, clearly, no ti ∈ T+i ∩ F gains by deviating to
(s¯i, e¯i). To see that no ti ∈ T−i ∩F has an incentive to deviate, let tˆ′i ∈ T γi denote such a
type and suppose tˆi ∈ Tαi . Recall that (s¯i, e¯i) ∈ Rβi . Since tˆi ∈ T+i ∩ F and tˆ′i ∈ T−i ∩ F ,
incentive compatibility implies α ≥ β ≥ γ. By Lemma 7, Xˆ∗i (tˆi) ≥ Xˆ∗i (tˆ′i), so tˆ′i has no
incentive to deviate to (s¯i, e¯i) after this change.
Negative types can be handled by a symmetric argument.
We complete the proof by constructing a robust equilibrium of the game without
commitment which gives the principal the same payoff as in the optimal mechanism. We
then use this equilibrium to construct an optimal mechanism which is deterministic and
robustly incentive compatible with the same outcome as the equilibrium.
To construct the equilibrium for the game without commitment, let the strategy
for agent i be the same as her strategy in the equilibrium of the auxiliary game for i.
Similarly, the principal’s belief about ti when he observes (si, ei) is given by his belief in
the auxiliary game for i.
Similarly to the proof of Lemma 6, for each vˆ = (1, vˆ1, . . . , vˆI) ∈ RI+1, let pˆ(· | vˆ)
denote any p(·) ∈ ∆(A) which (a) is a degenerate distribution and (b) maximizes∑
a
p(a)
I∑
i=0
ui(a)vˆi. (3)
Let the principal’s strategy given (s, e) be to choose pˆ(· | vˆ(s, e)) where vˆi(s, e) =
X∗i (si, ei) for i = 1, . . . , I and vˆ0(s, e) = 1. Clearly, this satisfies sequential rational-
ity for the principal.
To see that this specification gives a robust equilibrium, consider any ti and suppose
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the other agents report (t−i, e−i). If ti deviates from her proposed equilibrium strategy
to a different strategy inducing the same expected value of vi, this does not change the
principal’s action by construction. Hence such a deviation is not profitable. If ti deviates
to a strategy which induces a different expected value, then, by the fact that we started
from an equilibrium of the auxiliary game, this change must be against ti. That is, the
change must lower the expected value if ti is a positive type and raise it if ti is negative.
By Lemma 5, such a deviation cannot be profitable. Hence we have a robust equilibrium.
Because the principal receives at least as much information from the equilibrium
strategies as the mechanism partition, his expected payoff must be at least as large as
in the optimal mechanism. Clearly, it cannot be strictly larger than the payoff to the
optimal mechanism, so it must be equal.
Hence committing to this strategy is an optimal indirect mechanism. It is straightfor-
ward to rewrite this as an optimal direct mechanism. It is deterministic by construction.
It is straightforward to show that the robustness of the equilibrium implies that this
mechanism is robustly incentive compatible.
B Proof of Lemma 1 and Theorem 3
For Lemma 1, the existence and uniqueness of v+i follows from Theorem 2 taking the set
of types to be T+i . For v
−
i , note that Theorem 2 applied to the function −vi(ti) and types
T−i implies that there is a unique v
−
i satisfying
−v−i = Eti [−vi(ti) | ti ∈ T 0i ∩ T−i or (ti ∈ T−i \ T 0i and − vi(ti) ≤ −v−i )]
which can be rewritten as the definition of v−i .
Next, we show that there exists v∗i solving
v∗i =Eti
[
vi(ti) | (ti ∈ T 0i ) or (ti ∈ T−i \ T 0i and vi(ti) ≥ v∗i )
or (ti ∈ T+i \ T 0i and vi(ti) ≤ v∗i )
]
. (4)
Let gi(v
∗
i ) be the function on the right–hand side. We show there is v
∗
i solving v
∗
i = gi(v
∗
i ).
Suppose not. Let v1i < v
2
i < . . . < v
N
i denote the values of vi(ti) for ti /∈ T 0i . First,
note that for v∗i ≤ v1i , we have gi(v∗i ) = Eti [vi(ti) | ti ∈ T 0i ∪ T−i ]. If Eti [vi(ti) | ti ∈
T 0i ∪ T−i ] ≤ v1i , then v∗i = Eti [vi(ti) | ti ∈ T 0i ∪ T−i ] is a solution to equation (4). So our
hypothesis that there is no solution implies Eti [vi(ti) | ti ∈ T 0i ∪ T−i ] > v1i .
The function gi(v
∗
i ) is constant in v
∗
i for v
∗
i ∈ (vki , vk+1i ) but may be discontinuous
at each vki . The important point is that if gi(v
k
i − ε) > vki for all sufficiently small
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ε > 0, then gi(v
k
i + ε) > v
k
i as well. That is, the function can never jump from above
the 45◦ line to below. To see this, first suppose vki ∈ vi(T−i ).15 In this case, as v∗i
increases from just below to just above vki , we remove v
k
i from the conditioning set. If
gi(v
k
i ) > v
k
i , removing this point from the conditioning set implies that gi(v
k
i +ε) > gi(v
k
i ).
If vi ∈ vi(T+i ), then as v∗i increases from just below to just above vki , we add vki to the
conditioning set. If gi(v
k
i −ε) > vki , adding this point to the conditioning set implies that
gi(v
k
i − ε) > gi(vki ) > vki . So, again, the function remains above the 45◦ line.
By hypothesis, we have no solution, so gi(v
1
i ) > v
1
i . Since gi cannot jump below
the 45◦ line, the lack of a solution implies gi(v∗i ) > v
∗
i for all v
∗
i ≥ v1i . In particular,
gi(v
N
i ) > v
N
i . But gi(v
∗
i ) = Eti [vi(ti) | ti ∈ T 0i ∪ T+i ] for all v∗i ≥ vNi . So there exists
v∗i > v
N
i solving (4), a contradiction.
To show uniqueness, suppose v1i and v
2
i are solutions to (4) where v
1
i > v
2
i . Let
T k+i = {ti ∈ T+i \ T 0i | vi(ti) ≤ vki }, k = 1, 2
and
T k−i = {ti ∈ T−i \ T 0i | vi(ti) ≥ vki }, k = 1, 2.
Clearly, since v1i > v
2
i , we have T
2+
i ⊆ T 1+i and T 1−i ⊆ T 2−i . But
vki = Eti [vi(ti) | ti ∈ T 0i ∪ T k+i ∪ T k−i ].
Let
v˜i = Eti [vi(ti) | ti ∈ T 0i ∪ T 2+i ∪ T 1−i ].
Then v1i is a convex combination of v˜i and Eti [vi(ti) | ti ∈ T 1+i \T 2+i ], while v2i is a convex
combination of v˜i and Eti [vi(ti) | ti ∈ T 2−i \ T 1−i ]. It is easy to see that
v2i ≤ Eti [vi(ti) | ti ∈ T 1+i \ T 2+i ] ≤ v1i
since v2i ≤ vi(ti) ≤ v1i for all ti ∈ T 1+i \ T 2+i . Similarly,
v2i ≤ Eti [vi(ti) | ti ∈ T 2−i \ T 1−i ] ≤ v1i .
Since v1i is a convex combination of v˜i and a term smaller than v
1
i , we have v˜i ≥ v1i .
Since v2i is a convex combination of v˜i and a term larger than v
2
i , we have v
2
i ≥ v˜i. Hence
v1i ≤ v˜i ≤ v2i , contradicting v1i > v2i .
Turning to Theorem 3, we construct equilibrium strategies. If X∗i (si, Ti) > X
∗
i (s
′
i, Ti),
no positive type sends report (s′i, Ti) and no negative type sends (si, Ti). Hence there
are, at most, two distinct values of x∗i (si, Ti) observed on the equilibrium path. Let
15vi(T
−
i ) is the set of vi such that vi = vi(ti) for some ti ∈ T−i and vi(T+i ) (see below) is defined
analogously.
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v˜+i = maxsi∈Ti x
∗
i (si, Ti) and v˜
−
i = minsi∈Ti x
∗
i (si, Ti). First, assume v˜
+
i > v˜
−
i . Then every
positive type ti ∈ T 0i sends a report generating v˜+i as does every positive type ti /∈ T 0i
with vi(ti) ≤ v˜+i . Similarly, every negative type ti ∈ T 0i or not in T 0i but with vi(ti) ≥ v˜−i
sends some report generating v˜−i . All other types ti send a report of the form (si, {ti}).
Hence v˜+i must equal v
+
i and v˜
−
i must equal v
−
i . This is an equilibrium iff v
+
i ≥ v−i . Note
that if v+i = v
−
i , then the expectation of vi given the set of types sending either report
must also be the same value. Thus in this case, we have v−i = v
+
i = v
∗
i .
There is also an equilibrium where the principal ignores the type report. Letting v˜i
denote the principal’s expected value of vi given evidence report ei = Ti, positive types
with vi(ti) > v˜i will prove their types as will negative types with vi(ti) < v˜i. Hence v˜i
must satisfy equation (4), so v˜i = v
∗
i .
C Costly Verification
We show that for a class of costly verification models with simple type dependence, the
optimal mechanism can be computed using our results for optimal mechanisms with Dye
evidence. Continue to let A denote the finite set of actions available to the principal, Ti
the finite set of types of agent i with the same distributional assumptions as in the text,
and continue to assume that agent i’s utility function can be written as
ui(a, ti) =
{
ui(a), if ti ∈ T+i ;
−ui(a), if ti ∈ T−i ,
and that the principal’s utility function can be written as v(a, t) =
∑I
i=0 ui(a)vi(ti).
We add three assumptions on preferences. First, each agent has exactly two indiffer-
ence curves in A.16 That is, for each agent i, we can partition A into nonempty17 sets A0i
and A1i where
ui(a) =
{
0, if a ∈ A0i ;
1, if a ∈ A1i .
(Because ui does not depend on ti, the sets A
0
i and A
1
i are common knowledge.) For ex-
ample, this assumption holds in the allocation example and most of the related problems
discussed in Example 1 of Section 1 as well as the public goods problem discussed in
Example 4. It also holds in the public goods problem discussed in Erlanson and Kleiner
(2017) (after renormalizing).
16This also includes “agent 0” — that is, this also applies to the utility function u0(a).
17If either set is empty for i 6= 0, then the agent is indifferent over all choices by the principal and
incentive compatibility is trivially satisfied. Hence we can disregard any such agent.
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Second, assume that for all i, either T−i = ∅ or vi(ti) > vi(t′i) for all ti ∈ T+i and
t′i ∈ T−i . I.e., either i’s preferences are type independent or every positive type has a
higher vi than every negative type. Erlanson and Kleiner make the latter assumption.
For the costly verification model, agents do not have evidence to present. Instead, the
principal can check agent i at a cost ci > 0. “Checking” agent i means that the principal
learns agent i’s type ti. We show that the optimal mechanism can be computed by
an appropriate “translation” of a related mechanism design problem with Dye evidence
instead of costly verification.
Note that our assumptions imply that if vi(ti) = vi(t
′
i), then either both are positive
types or both are negative. Since agents do not have evidence, this means that ti and t
′
i
are identical and there is no need to distinguish them. Hence we write the type set for i
as Ti = {t0i , . . . , tKii } where vi(tki ) < vi(tk+1i ) for k = 0, . . . , Ki − 1.
One can show that it is without loss of generality to focus on mechanisms with the
following structure. First, all agents simultaneously make cheap talk reports of types to
the principal. The mechanism specifies a probability distribution over which agents to
check and what a ∈ A to choose as a function of the reports. Each agent will have an
incentive to report his type honestly, so when the principal checks an agent, he finds that
the report was truthful. Off the equilibrium path, if the principal finds that an agent has
lied, the principal chooses any action which is worst for that agent. (Since the agents
all expect the other agents to report honestly, the specification of the mechanism for
histories where multiple agents are found to have lied is irrelevant.)
Hence we can write a mechanism as a function P : T → ∆(2I×A) where P (Q, a | t) is
the probability that the principal checks the agents in the set Q ⊆ I and chooses action
a ∈ A when the type reports are t and the checking verifies the reports were honest. The
expected payoff of the principal from such a mechanism is
Et
 ∑
(Q,a)∈2I×A
P (Q, a | t)
(
v(a, t)−
∑
i∈Q
ci
) .
Let
p(a | t) =
∑
Q⊆I
P (Q, a | t)
qi(t) =
∑
a∈A
∑
Q⊆I|i∈Q
P (Q, a | t).
Then we can rewrite the principal’s expected payoff as
Et
[∑
a∈A
p(a | t)v(a, t)−
∑
i
qi(t)ci
]
.
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Using the fact that v(a, t) =
∑
i ui(a)vi(ti), we can rewrite this as
Et
[∑
i
vi(ti)
∑
a∈A
p(a | t)ui(a)−
∑
i
qi(t)ci
]
.
Let pi(t) =
∑
a∈A1i p(a | t). That is, pi(t) is the probability that the principal selects an
action a such that ui(a) = 1 given type profile t. Then the principal’s expected payoff is
Et
[∑
i
(pi(t)vi(ti)− qi(t)ci)
]
=
∑
i
Eti [pˆi(ti)vi(ti)− qˆi(ti)ci],
where pˆi(ti) = Et−ipi(t) and qˆi(ti) = Et−iqi(ti, t−i).
If agent i of type ti reports truthfully, his expected utility in mechanism P is
Et−i
∑
(Q,a)∈2I×A
P (Q, a | t)ui(a)
if ti ∈ T+i and this times −1 otherwise. So the expected payoff to a positive type from
reporting truthfully is pˆi(ti), while the expected payoff to a negative type is −pˆi(ti).
If agent i is type ti but reports t
′
i 6= ti, he may be caught lying. If so, as noted above,
the principal chooses an action which minimizes his payoff. So if ti ∈ T+i , his payoff will
be 0 if he is caught lying, while if ti ∈ T−i , it will be −1. Hence for a positive type, the
expected payoff to the deviation is
Et−i
 ∑
(Q,a)∈2I×A|i/∈Q
P (Q, a | t′i, t−i)ui(a)

= Et−i
 ∑
(Q,a)∈2I×A
P (Q, a | t′i, t−i)ui(a)−
∑
(Q,a)∈2I×A|i∈Q
P (Q, a | t′i, t−i)ui(a)

= pˆi(t
′
i)− Et−i
 ∑
(Q,a)∈2I×A|i∈Q,a∈A1i
P (Q, a | t′i, t−i)
 .
We will simplify this expression further below.
If a negative type is caught reporting falsely, the principal chooses an action setting
ui(a) = 1 so that the agent’s payoff is −1. Hence the expected payoff to a negative type
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ti from claiming to be t
′
i 6= ti is
Et−i
 ∑
(Q,a)∈2I×A|i/∈Q
P (Q, a | t′i, t−i)(−ui(a))−
∑
(Q,a)∈2I×A|i∈Q
P (Q, a | t′i, t−i)

= Et−i
− ∑
(Q,a)∈2I×A
P (Q, a | t′i, t−i)ui(a)−
∑
(Q,a)∈2I×A|i∈Q
P (Q, a | t′i, t−i)(1− ui(a))

= −pˆi(t′i)− Et−i
 ∑
(Q,a)∈2I×A|i∈Q,a∈A0i
P (Q, a | t′i, t−i)
 .
Summarizing, the incentive compatibility constraint for agent i is that for all positive
types ti ∈ T+i , we have
pˆi(ti) ≥ pˆi(t′i)− Et−i
 ∑
(Q,a)∈2I×A|i∈Q,a∈A1i
P (Q, a | t′i, t−i)
 , ∀t′i 6= ti (5)
and for all negative types ti ∈ T−i , we have
pˆi(ti) ≤ pˆi(t′i) + Et−i
 ∑
(Q,a)∈2I×A|i∈Q,a∈A0i
P (Q, a | t′i, t−i)
 , ∀t′i 6= ti. (6)
Note that the right–hand side of each incentive compatibility constraint is independent
of ti. Hence (5) holds for all positive types ti iff it holds for the positive type with the
smallest pˆi(ti) and (6) holds for all negative types ti iff it holds for that negative type
with the largest pˆi(ti).
The optimal mechanism is monotonic in the sense that pˆi(t
k
i ) ≤ pˆi(tk+1i ) for k =
0, . . . , Ki − 1. To see this, recall that vi(tki ) < vi(tk+1i ), so the principal is better off with
higher values of pi associated with higher values of ti. Suppose we have an incentive
compatible mechanism with pˆi(t
k
i ) > pˆi(t
k+1
i ) for some k and i. Consider the mechanism
which reverses the roles of these types — i.e., assigns the outcome (Q, a) to (tki , t−i) that
it would have assigned to (tk+1i , t−i) and vice versa.
18 This altered mechanism is also
incentive compatible and yields the principal a higher expected payoff.19
18To be precise, this implicitly assumes the two types have the same prior probability. If not, we can
reverse the role of one of the types and “part of” the other.
19If tki and t
k+1
i are both positive or both negative, then it is easy to see from (5) or (6) that the
altered mechanism is incentive compatible. Our assumptions implies that if one of these types is positive
aod one negative, then the negative type is tki . It is easy to see that in this case, reversing the roles of
the types makes incentive compatibility easier to satisfy.
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By assumption, for every i, either T−i = ∅ or vi(ti) > vi(t′i) for all ti ∈ T+i , t′i ∈ T−i .
Hence if there are Ji negative types (where Ji can be zero), the negative types are
t0i , . . . , t
Ji−1
i and the positive types are t
Ji
i , . . . , t
Ki
i . Thus the positive type with the
lowest pˆi(ti) is t
Ji
i , while the negative type with the highest pˆi(ti) is t
Ji−1
i and we have
pˆi(t
J1−1
i ) ≤ pˆi(tJii ). So we can write the incentive compatibility constraints (5) and (6) as
pˆi(t
Ji
i ) ≥ pˆi(t′i)− Et−i
 ∑
(Q,a)∈2I×A|i∈Q,a∈A1i
P (Q, a | t′i, t−i)
 , ∀t′i 6= ti (7)
and
pˆi(t
Ji−1
i ) ≤ pˆi(t′i) + Et−i
 ∑
(Q,a)∈2I×A|i∈Q,a∈A0i
P (Q, a | t′i, t−i)
 , ∀t′i 6= ti. (8)
The following lemma generalizes results in Ben Porath, Dekel, and Lipman (2014)
and Erlanson and Kleiner (2017).
Lemma 9. In any optimal mechanism, we have
P (Q, a | ti, t−i) = 0, ∀t−i if ti ∈ T+i , i ∈ Q, and a ∈ A0i (9)
P (Q, a | ti, t−i) = 0, ∀t−i if ti ∈ T−i , i ∈ Q, and a ∈ A1i . (10)
Consequently, we can rewrite the incentive compatibility constraints (7) and (8) as
pˆi(t
Ji
i ) ≥ pˆi(ti)− qˆi(ti), ∀ti ∈ T+i (11)
pˆi(t
Ji−1
i ) ≤ pˆi(ti) + qˆi(ti), ∀ti ∈ T−i . (12)
Proof. First, we show that we only require (7) for t′i ∈ T+i and (8) for t′i ∈ T−i . Specifically,
monotonicity of pˆi implies that (7) holds for all t
′
i ∈ T−i and (8) holds for all t′i ∈ T+i .
To see this, fix any t′i ∈ T−i . By assumption, vi(t′i) ≤ vi(tJii ), so monotonicity implies
pˆi(t
Ji
i ) ≥ pˆi(t′i). Since pˆi(t′i) is weakly larger than the right–hand side of (7), this implies
(7) holds. A similar argument gives (8) for t′i ∈ T+i .
Next, suppose (9) fails, so we have an optimal mechanism P with P (Q, a | ti, t−i) > 0
for some t−i ∈ T−i, ti ∈ T+i , i ∈ Q, and a ∈ A0i . In other words, there is a positive
probability that the principal checks a positive type and chooses an action giving that
agent a payoff of zero. Construct a new mechanism P ∗ as follows. For any (Q′, a′) 6= (Q, a)
or t′ 6= t, let P ∗(Q′, a′ | t′) = P (Q′, a′ | t′). Let P ∗(Q, a | t) = 0 and let P ∗(Q \ {i}, a |
t) = P (Q, a | t) + P (Q \ {i}, a | t). In other words, if i is checked but gets a zero payoff
at (Q, a), we shift this probability to (Q \ {i}, a), where i does not get checked but still
gets the same zero payoff. The incentive compatibility constraints for any agent j 6= i
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are unaffected. Since ti is a positive type, the only incentive compatibility constraint
for i that is potentially affected is (7) at t′i = ti or where ti = t
Ji
i . But since we have
only changed the checking probability and not the marginal probabilities over actions
a ∈ A, pˆi(ti) is unaffected. Similarly, the second term on the right–hand side of (7) for
t′i = ti only involves actions in A
1
i , so this term also is unaffected. Hence P
∗ is incentive
compatible. Finally, since the probability over A is unchanged but the principal checks
less often, his payoff must be strictly larger, a contradiction. A symmetric argument
establishes (10).
To conclude, consider equation (7) for t′i. Since P (Q, a | t′i, t−i) = 0 if a ∈ A0i , we see
that ∑
(Q,a)∈2I×A|i∈Q,a∈A1i
P (Q, a | t′i, t−i) =
∑
(Q,a)∈2I×A|i∈Q
P (Q, a | t′i, t−i) = qi(t′i, t−i).
Hence we can rewrite (7) as pˆi(t
Ji
i ) ≥ pˆi(t′i) − qˆi(t′i) for all t′i ∈ T+i . A similar argument
applied to (8) completes the proof.
We can compute qˆi(t
′
i) for all t
′
i using Lemma 9. Since qˆi is costly for the principal,
the inequalities in equations (11) and (12) must hold with equality, so
qˆi(ti) =
{
pˆi(ti)− pˆi(tJii ), if ti ∈ T+i ;
pˆi(t
Ji−1
i )− pˆi(ti), if ti ∈ T−i .
Substitute into the objective function for qˆi and rewrite it as∑
i
Eti [pˆi(ti)vi(ti)− qˆi(ti)ci] =
∑
i
[Ji−1∑
k=0
ρi(t
k
i )[pˆi(t
k
i )(vi(t
k
i ) + ci)− pˆi(tJi−1i )ci] (13)
+
Ki∑
k=Ji
ρi(t
k
i )[pˆi(t
k
i )(vi(t
k
i )− ci) + pˆi(tJii )ci]
]
.
The only remaining incentive constraints are that pˆi(ti) ≤ pˆi(tJi−1i ) ≤ pˆi(tJii ) for all
negative types ti and pˆi(t
Ji−1
i ) ≤ pˆi(tJii ) ≤ pˆi(ti) for all positive types ti.
Now consider a different mechanism design problem, this one with evidence instead
of costly verification. We have the same set of types as in the problem above and the
same ui functions. As above, types t
0
i , . . . , t
Ji−1
i are negative and types t
Ji
i , . . . , t
Ki
i are
positive. The principal’s objective function is now
∑
i ui(a)v˜i(ti) where
v˜i(ti) =

vi(ti)− ci, if ti ∈ T+i and ti 6= tJii ;
vi(ti) + ci, if ti ∈ T−i and ti 6= tJi−1i ;
vi(t
Ji
i )− ci + ciρi(tJii )
∑Ki
k=Ji
ρi(t
k
i ), if ti = t
Ji
i ;
vi(t
Ji−1
i ) + ci − ciρi(tJi−1i )
∑Ji−1
k=0 ρi(t
k
i ), if ti = t
Ji−1
i .
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It is easy to see that this specification of v˜i makes the principal’s objective function in
this problem the same as the expression in equation (13).
We specify the evidence structure as follows. For any ti other than t
Ji−1
i or t
Ji
i , we have
Ei(ti) = {{ti}, Ti}. Also, Ei(tJi−1i ) = Ei(tJii ) = {Ti}. The implied incentive compatibility
constraints are the following. First, since types tJi−1i and t
Ji
i can each claim to be the
other and send the other’s (trivial) maximal evidence, each must weakly prefer her own
allocation. Since tJi−1i is a negative type and t
Ji
i is positive, this implies pˆi(t
Ji−1
i ) ≤ pˆi(tJii ).
Hence any other negative type prefers imitating tJi−1i to imitating t
Ji
i , while any positive
type has the opposite preference. So the only other incentive compatibility constraints
are pˆi(ti) ≤ pˆi(tJi−1i ) for any negative type ti and pˆi(ti) ≥ pˆi(tJii ) for any positive type ti,
the same constraints as in the costly verification model.
Hence we can apply our results on optimal mechanisms with Dye evidence to com-
pute the optimal mechanism for the evidence model as a function of v˜i. We can then
substitute in terms of vi to rewrite in terms of the original costly verification model. It
is straightforward to show that doing so for the case considered in BDL (2014) or for the
case considered in Erlanson and Kleiner (2017) yields the optimal mechanism identified
there.
Because the assumptions used here also cover these cases, we can use this approach
and the characterization given in Examples 2 and 3 of Section 3.1 to characterize optimal
mechanisms with costly verification for the case where the principal allocates multiple
identical goods or the case where he allocates a “bad.”
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